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 3 
INTRODUCTION	
 
„After the soldiers killed her husband and sons, five of them held her 
down and forced her to watch as three others raped her 10-year-old 
daughter. Her name was Nyalaat. When the men were done, Mary says, “I 
couldn’t even see my little girl anymore. I could only see blood.” Then the 
men took turns with Mary. Nyalaat died a few hours later.”1 
 
A mother’s pain and grief. A 27-year-old woman who watched her life destroyed during a 
conflict in South Sudan. Yet it is not a particularly unusual story. Children clinging to their 
mothers’ legs, crying, as their mothers are taken aside to be raped by soldiers. Mothers 
watching their daughters sexually abused, mutilated, killed.2 Enslaved women in rape camps, 
released when finally pregnant.3 Rape as a tactic of war is presumably as old as war itself.  
  
Broken bodies, deaths, unwanted pregnancies, child abandonment, HIV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases, genital mutilation, pain, isolation, stigmatization, shame, depression, 
anxiety, suicide, fear, anger, humiliation, social exclusion, eroticism of violence, 
discrimination, inequality, body objectification, development of rape culture,4 if to name just 
some of the consequences of rape. The health consequences of sexual violence can influence 
the reproductive and mental health, behavior and also the fatality of the victims.  
 
Rape as a tactic has been a highly effective method of dehumanisation, domination, 
humiliation, and in a sense an attack against the masculinity of men for whom these rapes 
ought to prove that they are unable to protect their women.5 In some cultures the status of 
being a victim of sexual violence is seen as the victim is defiled and dishonored. They are 
ostrascized by their community, rape might also take away their worthiness to marriage or to 
                                                
1 A. Baker. Survivors of wartime rape are refusing to be silenced. Story series of “Secret War Crime.” 
Time 2016. Accessible: http://time.com/war-and-rape/ (01.02.2018). 
2 Ibid. 
3  D. M. Crowe. War Crimes, Genocide, and Justice: A Global History. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2014, p. 343. 
4 K. T. Hagen, S. C. Yohani. The Nature and Psychological Consequences of War Rape for 
Individuals and Communities. International Journal of Psychological Studies 2010, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 14. 
5 C. De than. E. Shorts. International Criminal law and human rights 2003, p. 347. 
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give birth to children. Consequently, sexual violence can destroy not just individuals, but 
families and communities in a way no other weapon ever could. And then comes the darkest 
secret of sexual violence as a tactic of war – victims are not just women. Social hierarchies 
and gender roles tend to have an enormous effect on the notion of male rape, even when 
authorities are dealing with the aftermath, the existence of the issue is often denied. The 
stigmatization that comes with male rape is even more dishonoring than female rape. The 
position that men have in some societies creates the situation where it is far harder for them to 
fight for justice in case of male rape. There have been many male sexual violence cases 
reported throughout history, also one-third of the cases referred in this thesis have dealt with 
male rape, castration, mutilation, sexual assaults etc. These are not isolated cases, yet the 
problem somehow remains largely invisible and is often absent from international 
jurisprudence. Beside the social stigmatization and ostracism, the victims of male rape can 
also face accusations of homosexuality6 and persecution.7 Thus, for receiving persecution and 
possibly even punishment, it is understandable why male rape is beyond under-reported.8 
 
                                                
6 Research suggests that some police officers are homophobic towards the victims of male on male 
rape since there is still belief on the myth that male rape is solely a homosexual issue. The victims are 
labelled homosexual, weak, less masculine or less men, and perceived as less legitimate victims and 
less deserving for help. See, e.g. N. Abdullah-Khan. Male rape: The emergence of a social and legal 
issue. Springer 2008. P. NS. Rumney. Policing male rape and sexual assault. The Journal of Criminal 
Law 2008, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 67-86. And, S. Sivakumaran. Male/male rape and the" taint" of 
homosexuality. Human Rights Quarterly 2005, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 1274-1306. And these studies only 
analyzed the police perceptions over the issue, not the general public’s. Most of these researches were 
conducted in Western countries, which are indeed quite liberal compared to e.g. some African 
countries. For instance, homosexuality in Africa is outlawed in 33 countries, e.g. in Sudan, northern 
Nigeria and Somalia homosexuality is punishable by death. In countries like Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, you can receive life imprisonment for homosexual acts. 
7 Not just homosexual relations between men are prohibited, but most of these countries also prohibit 
sexual relationship between females. To understand the level of stigma and persecution, it would be 
important to note, that it is not just hate crimes committed against the LGBT community and 
prosecuting people for homosexuality/homosexual acts, but also something that reflects the cultural 
affiliations over the response to homosexuality is that the term corrective rape was coined in South 
Africa which is a hate crime of raping one for their sexual orientation with the intended consequence 
of turning the person heterosexual, thus to punish and reinforce social norms. E.g. in South Africa, 
which is a more liberal country than its neighbours, the prevalence of corrective rape has only 
increased over years. The practice of using rape to persecute homosexuals makes it understandable 
why people would be afraid to report same-sex rape in some countries (just to clarify, in South Africa 
homosexuality is legal and that is probably the reason we have most reported cases of corrective rape 
from South Africa). Thus, by reporting, it is not just the punishment by the authorities and the stigma 
you have to be afraid of but also community members. They clearly take homosexuality more 
seriously than prosecuting rape crimes. –  See also, S. Hawthorne. Ancient hatred and its 
contemporary manifestation: The torture of lesbians. The Journal of Hate studies 2006, vol. 4, no. 1, 
pp. 33-58. A. Martin, et al. Hate crimes: the rise of corrective rape in South Africa. Action Aid 2009, 
and this article - Men are also corrective rape’ victims, 2014. Accessible: 
http://bhekisisa.org/article/2014-04-11-men-are-also-corrective-rape-victims (11.03.2018). 
8 H. M. Zawati. Impunity or immunity: wartime male rape and sexual torture as a crime against 
humanity. Journal on Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and Prevention of Torture 2007, pp. 27-47. 
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Lawlessness over the issue can create a culture of impunity. It is hard to imagine a situation 
where an ordinary rule of international law would permit rape under any circumstances, and 
purely by this logic rape evinces the non-derogable character necessary for establishing a 
principle of ius cogens. Furthermore, rape is included as a constituent element of every 
accepted peremptory norm. Yet in contrast to other norms that de facto have the status of ius 
cogens, the international community remained in relative silence for a long time. It is for 
relatively recently when the international law made substantial developments in defining and 
prosecuting rape under the international criminal law. The practice of international courts and 
tribunals to apply to rape and sexual violence is in a way both distinct and overlapping. But 
regardless of the hardships, the tribunals have seen in their search for the adequate definition 
of the crime of rape, they have made many significant efforts for furthering the development 
of the jurisprudence of rape and sexual violence in international criminal law.  
 
The definition of sex crimes differs in many ways, there are different offences that fall into 
the category of sex crimes, the differences in national legislations, differences in prosecution 
etc., but in general sex crimes involve illegal or coerced sexual conduct, usually for sexual 
motives, against another person.9 Though, even nowadays in many jurisdictions the definition 
can be gender-biased and too narrow, e.g. it is rape only when the victim is female (male rape 
is not acknowledged in law) and the narrow definitions often define rape as a penile 
penetration of vagina, which means that oral and anal penetration is not considered as a rape 
crime.10 Not only that, the category under which the jurisdiction regards the crime has 
differed from rape being seen as a crime of violence, a crime of property, a crime of sex or a 
crime against honor.11 Regardless how we define sex crimes, sexual violence as a tactic often 
occur as a whole different phenomenon with its own distinct characteristics compared to sex 
crimes committed mainly on sexual motivation. The malum in se nature and motives of the 
sex crimes as a tactic may differ in such a level, that it is substantial, particularly with regards 
to the contemporary international criminal law practice, to acknowledge, recognize and 
prosecute such acts. To this day, rape remains to be one of the most vastly under-reported and 
inadequately litigated of all international crimes.12 
 
                                                
9 M. D. Smith. (ed.). Encyclopedia of rape. Greenwood Publishing Group 2004, p. 169.  
10 Ibid, p. 169-170. 
11 Ibid.  
12 J. A. Jones. Addressing the Use of Sexual Violence as a Strategic Weapon of War. Inquiries Journal  
2013, vol. 5. No. 04, p. 1. Accessible: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/732/addressing-the-
use-of-sexual-violence-as-a-strategic-weapon-of-war (01.02.2018). 
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It is clear that not all sex crimes happening during conflicts do not fall under the scope in 
question since some acts can be perpetrated by individuals not belonging to armed forces but 
in an opportunistic way of taking advantage, and committing horrible things to people in a 
situation of impunity, chaos and hatred. Sex crimes that are not first-hand driven by sexual 
motives, but used as a tool, means, strategy, weapon or however to call it, with the motivation 
of achieving specific goals by using sex crimes as an instrument of terror should fall under 
what we recognize as grave breaches. The striving intentions can be just terrorizing the 
population, but also destroying the whole communities, breaking up families, ethnic 
cleansing, deliberately infecting women with HIV etc. Moreover, the problem with sexual 
violence is, that its impact is far more reaching than just during the conflict. Some are never 
able to leave the battlefield for their sufferings.13  
 
Rape and other forms of sexual violence are probably one of the worst violations of one’s 
bodily integrity that can occur. Nevertheless, some major differences prevail in both actus 
reus and mens rea of the crime of rape while considering if the crime occurs in the context 
international criminal law or outside of it. Rape and other forms of sexual violence can 
amount to international crimes if the conditions for these crimes are fulfilled. The author 
believes that sexual violence that can amount to international crimes, which are referenced as 
sexual violence as a tactic throughout this thesis, is distinct from sexual violence perpetrated 
for sexual motives. The author claims that three distinctive characteristics emerge when 
talking about tactical sexual violence. The first is the motive for the crime, the second is the 
very nature of the act itself, and thirdly, the context in which the crime takes place. Hence, the 
objective of this study is establishing what the concept of rape and sexual violence as a tactic 
is about, and then illustrating how the definition of rape crime ought to be regarding the 
concept of rape as a tactic and does the current law and practice correspond to it. As the line 
between rape and other forms of sexual violence is not always that clear and homogeneous, 
sexual violence in general, is also included in the analysis. 
 
The object of this thesis is rape and sexual violence as international crimes. The research gap 
the author intends to fill is combining the phenomenon and the jurisprudence of rape as a 
tactic to understand how the jurisprudence ought to be in the light of the phenomenology. It is 
an interdisciplinary analysis, which includes both legal and criminological notions. The thesis 
                                                
13  Background Information on Sexual Violence used as a Tool of War. Accessible: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml (01.03.2018). 
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has two parts, one focusing on the phenomenon and the second part on the jurisprudence of 
rape and sexual violence in international criminal law.  
 
Firstly, the aim is to determine what is rape and sexual violence as a method to commit 
international crimes. This, however, does not mean that there is a distinction made between 
war and peace. Beside war crimes, the analysis includes the crime of genocide and crimes 
against humanity which do not need a nexus with an armed conflict. The idea is to establish 
the distinct character of rape and sexual violence as a tactic, which is committed in the 
context of deliberate violence with specific intentions, and to distinguish tactical sexual 
violence as tool for group-based oppression from sexual violence that has more to do with 
individual physic’s space and is first-hand driven by sexual motives. Though the latter is more 
common in peacetime, as stated, for the purposes of this thesis, the distinction between war 
and peace is irrelevant. The first chapter gives a brief overview of the historical narratives 
related to tactical rape, contemporary practice and related law. The second chapter of the 
analysis is a case-study of the phenomenon of rape as a tactic. The analysis is comparative in 
the sense that the nature and the motives of tactical rape in different conflict settings are 
subject to comparison. For this, the author analyzed the qualitative data from the case-law of 
four international courts and tribunals – International Criminal Court (ICC), International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The analysis will focus 
on three main facets to determine the phenomenon of tactical rape crime: (i) the context of the 
crimes (where, on what circumstances); (ii) the nature of the crimes (the matter of how); and 
(iii) the motives striving behind the crime (the matter of why).  
 
The jurisprudence part of the thesis includes two chapters which focus on prosecuting and 
defining rape and sexual violence. As the term sexual violence encompasses different crimes, 
e.g. rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, forced impregnation etc., the principal focus is on the 
crime of rape and how in practice the distinction between rape and other forms of sexual 
violence is made as the line between the two is not always that clear and unequivocal. 
However, for limited space, different forms of sexual violence will not receive specific 
attention but are explained under the general term of sexual violence. Thus, the third chapter 
explains how rape has been prosecuted under international law, under which crimes and 
which elements must be fulfilled for that. The fourth chapter will focus on the definition of 
the crime of rape (and sexual violence) under the international criminal law, five different 
definitions are subject to analysis. For that the author will critically investigate 
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practice of international courts and tribunals on the issue of the definition of rape under the 
international criminal law, primarily relying on the court practice of ICTY, ICTR, ICC and 
SCSL. The data from the second part is an important determinant to understand whether the 
definition adequately addresses the phenomenon of tactical rape and gives solid protection to 
the victims. The non-consent issue is specifically argued there.   
 
The author firmly believes, while taking into account the nature and the motives of rape as a 
tactic, the coercive environment itself is abrogating the possibility to genuinely consent. For 
that, the author sets out a hypothesis, that the consent paradigm, where the non-consent is an 
element of the definition of the crime of rape in international criminal law, does not 
adequately address the phenomenon of rape as a tactic. The author further sets out the 
following research questions to be answered: (i) what is rape as a tactic; (ii) what are the 
elements of the crime of rape in international criminal law; (iii) do those elements adequately 
address the crime of rape under international criminal law, in particular taking account the 
specific nature, context and motives of the crime; (iv) what is the distinction between rape and 
other sexual violence.  
 
The primary sources of the thesis are the international legal framework governing the 
prohibition of rape and sexual violence in the context of international criminal law and 
international humanitarian law, and the jurisprudence of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals. To 
some extent, the author also relied on the peer-reviewed literature, comments on the case law 
and reports of different NGOs. The author used analytical and comparative methods for 
analysis. 
 
The following keywords characterize this thesis: international criminal law, rape as a tactic, 
systematic sexual violence. 
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PART	I.	RAPE	AND	SEXUAL	VIOLENCE	AS	A	TACTIC		
Chapter	1.	Antecedent	background		
 
Rape has always been present in the history of humanity. Even the early religious texts14 and 
greek mythology15 included references to rape. Sexual violence is an efficient tool. The most 
common reasons for why sexual violence is used in conflicts are: (i) rape as a reward; (ii) rape 
as a means of creating cohesion between combatants; (iii) rape as a strategy of war; (iv) rape 
as a means to destroy social and cultural coherence; (v) rape for economic ends; (vi) rape as a 
means of extracting information.16 Thus, rape has been both, part of, and a consequence of, 
war. The latter notion is not stipulating that it is inevitable. Rape itself has not changed over 
time, what has changed is our perceptions, definitions and laws governing rape.17  
 
The prohibition against rape in war was codified as far back at the Lieber Code of 1863, and it 
did state that any soldier convicted would be punished with the death penalty. Though it was 
expressly prohibited already in 1863 and it showed awareness of sexual violence in armed 
conflict, the international community was not ready to resolutely confront the matter.18 Some 
decades later, the Hague Conventions made some vague commitments to respect family honor 
and rights,19 but these were of limited value since rather little legislative foundation was 
                                                
14 In Zechariah 14:2, the verse goes: ”for I [God] will gather all the nations against Jerusalemm to 
battle, and the city shall be taken and the houses looted and the women raped.” Deuteronomy 20:14 
adds to the thought of when one goes to war: ”You may, however, take as your booty the women, the 
children, livestock, and everything else in the town, all its spoil. You may enjoy the spoil of your 
enemies, which the Lord your God has given you.” The biblical texts are both a reflection of early 
days androcentrism and patriarchy, but in addition the Bible does seem to reflect that rape is normative 
in religious scriptures. For more examples, See, e.g. Gen 34:29, Deut 21:10-14, Numbers 31, Judg. 
5:28-30, 21:12-14, Isa 13:16, Jer 6:11, Zech 14:2. 
15 See, e.g. the rape of Helen of the Troy, Medusa, Philomela, Leda, Europa, Demeter, Antiope, 
Cassandra, Chrysippus etc. In many cases, associating both gods and men with sexual violence serves 
to pardon the crimes and also normalises and tolerates rape by proclaiming that they, the gods and 
men, are helpless to this invincible craving. See, e.g. C. Schodde. Rape culture in classical mythology. 
Found in antiquity 2013. Accessible: https://foundinantiquity.com/2013/10/06/rape-culture-in-
classical-mythology/#_ftn1 (11.03.2018). 
16 War on Women: Time for Action to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. Nobel Women’s Initiative 
2011. Accessible: http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/war-on-women-
web.pdf (11.03.2018). 
17 M. D. Smith. Encyclopedia of rape. Greenwood Publishing Group 2004, p. ix. 
18 A. Gillespie. A History of the Laws of War: Volume 3: The Customs and Laws of War with 
Regards to Arms Control. Bloomsbury Publishing 2011, p. 152. 
19 Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Art. 46: ”Family honours and rights, individual lives and 
private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected. 
Private property cannot be confiscated.” 
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given.20 
  
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg tribunal) and International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo tribunal) largely neglected the question of 
prosecution of sexual violence.21 Regardless that the protection against sexual violence was 
weak, the enforcement of this protection was minimal if not non-existent. The trials were held 
for individuals considered most culpable for the atrocities. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
prosecuted people for war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.22 The 
Nuremberg Trial set of transcripts, which is a 42 volume set and contains a 732-page index, 
does not include words ”rape” nor ”sexual violence” in any headings or sub-headings 
regardless that sexual violence was extensively committed and documented.23 The Tribunal 
failed to include any form of sexual violence charges and did not expressly prosecute such 
crimes, instead The Court did add rape by implication as torture. The Tokyo Tribunal did 
expressly prosecute rape, but to a limited extent in relation to other crimes and not one rape 
victim was called to give evidence. With one month 200 000 people were killed. Nanking 
massacre included both mass murder and mass rape. Rape was systematic, often in a form of 
gang rape, targeting women regardless of their age (the reports claim that the age of rape 
victims ranged between seven to seventy).24 The estimates tell us that approximately 20 000 
cases of rape occurred. 25  Thus, the prevalence is of such a scale that rape could no longer be 
ignored and neglected as an international crime. However, the Tokyo tribunal created a 
controversial narrative of events which shaped the memory of history as they saw it better. 
The strong bias in these trials added to the criticism, thus for some, it seemed that the trials 
were merely victor’s justice. The reluctance of the tribunal to classify rape as a serious crime 
of war still sought no justice for the victims, neglected the worthy of its prosecution. Sexual 
violence was not expressly enumerated in the Charters of neither of the Tribunals. The Tokyo 
                                                
20 K. D. Askin. War crimes against women: Prosecution in international war crimes tribunals. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997, p. 152. 
21 T. F. Lawson. A shift Towards Gender Equality in Prosecutions: realizing legitimate enforcement of 
crimes committed against women in municipal and international criminal law. Southern Illinios 
University Law Journal 2008, vol. 33, p. 204. 
22 United Nations, Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8.08.1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 280.  
23K. D. Askin, Kelly D. Prosecuting wartime rape and other gender-related crimes under international 
law: extraordinary advances, enduring obstacles. Berkeley Journal of International Law 2003, vol. 21, 
p. 295. 
24  Basic Facts on the Nanjing Massacre and the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Accessible: 
http://www.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html (11.03.2018). 
25 C. J. Picart. Attempting to go beyond forgetting: The legacy of the tokyo imt and crimes of violence 
against women. East Asia Law Review 2012, vol. 7, pp. 1-49. 
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Tribunal did at least include crimes of sexual nature to the indictment, although rape was 
labelled as a mistreatment, inhumane treatment, ill-treatment and a failure to respect family 
honor and rights.26   
 
There have been two ways of prohibiting sexual violence and rape. One is by expressly 
prohibiting rape, and the other possibility is being encompassed in less explicit provisions 
(e.g. torture, inhumane treatment, inhumane acts, willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body etc.). Though rape was recognized as a war crime since the Tokyo tribunals, 
and was incorporated in Control Council Law (CCL) No. 10 of Art. II(c) which recognized 
rape as a crime against humanity,27 the Geneva Convention 1949 showed that the fair 
labelling of sexual violence was still lacking. Art. 27 stated, that women need particular 
protection from attacks against their honor. The article expressly enumerates rape as one of 
the attacks against honor.28 This, however, was highly significant for the victims and for the 
international community that we made efforts on acknowledging the issue at all. But still, we 
did not recognize sexual violence as a grave breach. And the language – rape and sexual 
violence are classified as of ”attacks against the honor of women” or ” outrages upon human 
dignity.” The language instils the belief that a woman is dishonored and loses her dignity, this 
is a widespread belief, yet there should be no room for such fallacies in international 
humanitarian or criminal law. The position that these are honor crimes, marginalizes victims 
and trivialises these crimes. 29  
 
It was also added to Geneva Conventions (1977) and their additional protocols. Rape is 
prohibited by Article 76(1) of Additional Protocol I30 which states that ” Women shall be the 
object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution 
and any other form of indecent assault.”31 Additional Protocol II32 also explicitly prohibited 
                                                
26 M. M. Deguzman. An expressive rationale for the thematic prosecution of sex crimes. FICHL 
Publication Series No. 13. Bejing: Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher 2012, page 37. 
27 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace 
and Against Humanity. 20.12.1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946). 
28 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, art. 27. 
29 C. De Than. E. Shorts. International Criminal Law and Human Rights. London: Sweed and Maxwell 
2003, p. 349. 
30 Protocol additional to the geneva conventions of 12 august 1949,and relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts (protocol i), OF 8 JUNE 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  
31 Ibid, Art. 76(1). 
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rape against all persons who do not take direct part of or who have ceased to take part of the 
hostilities at any time and any place whatsoever.33 Though rape was not granted the status of a 
grave breach, it is possible to claim that rape can constitute a grave breach of the Convention 
by implication to some categories explicitly mentioned, e.g. torture or inhumane treatment.34 
In 1994 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) did recognize rape as a grave breach of 
the Geneva Conventions in their report. They also stated that International Tribunal will 
provide justice. The Commission also noted that peace requires justice and justice starts with 
the truth.35 Around that time, ICTY and ICTR were established. The prosecution of war 
crimes in general is a quite recent development, but the contribution and commitment of these 
tribunals to prosecute rape as international crimes have been indispensable.  
 
As the short overview of the legal developments was introduced, let us for a second also 
consider some figures of sexual violence in conflict. Systematic gang rapes, by going door to 
door to capture and rape of at least 20 000 Chinese women during Nanking Massacre. Brutal 
rapes, mutilations, and killings. Not even children were exempt.36 We do not know the exact 
number of rapes committed during the WWII, but the estimates are from hundreds of 
thousands to millions. The suggestion for this numbers comes from the unprecedented 
number of illegal abortions performed in Germany between 1945 and 1948. We are talking 
about one million illegal abortions here. Women from ages eight to eighty raped during 
WWII.37 Between 200 000 to 400 000 women and girls raped during Bangladesh Liberation 
War with some consequences as e.g. thousands of pregnancies from rapes, birth of war 
babies, abortions, infanticide and suicide if rapes did not kill you.38 Up to half a million rape 
and sexual violence victims in Rwanda conflict over the course of 100 days. The first mass 
rape to be determined as genocidal rape.39 An estimated 25 000 to 50 000 incidences of rape 
or other forms of sexual violence during Bosnian War, repeated gang rapes and creation of  
                                                                                                                                                   
32 Additional Protocol II, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 
entered into force 7.12.1978. 
33 Ibid, art. 4(2)(e). 
34 Supra note 28. 
35 Final Report of the Commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 
UN Doc. S/1994/674, 1994 para-s. 58-60, 232-253.  
36 G. Xingzu, et al. Japanese Imperialism and the Massacre in Nanjing. Chapter X: Widespread 
Incidents of Rape. Accessible:  http://museums.cnd.org/njmassacre/njm-tran/njm-ch10.htm 
(01.02.2018). 
37 A. Beevor. The Fall of Berlin 1945. London: Penguin Books 2003, p. 410.  
38 L. Sharlach. Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. New Political 
Science, 2002,  vol. 22 (1), pp. 89–102. 
39 A. Walsh. International Criminal Justice and the Girl Child, in L. Yarwood (ed). Women and 
Transitional Justice: The Experience of Women as Participants. London: Routledge 2012. 
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”rape camps.”40 Tens of thousands of rape victims during the Darfur genocide, where genital 
mutilation and rape of children is by no means an unfamiliar practice.41 In Guatemala, gang 
rape is a particular army strategy. Soldiers are also ordered to do the ”percha” which is a 
practice of 20 or 30 soldiers raping a single woman. This is what we know as rape unto 
death.42 In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rape has been used as a weapon of war 
for decades. Today rape is almost a cultural phenomenon.43 Margot Wallstrom, the UN 
special representative in conflict called DRC rape capital of the world by claiming that rape is 
a dominant feature in the country.44 A study published in 2011 claimed that out of the 
population of 70 million people 1.8 million women had been raped.45 This was seven years 
ago. This conflict is defined as a war against women for a reason. In Burma, both the Army 
and Border Guard Police have taken part in committing gang rapes against civilians fleeing 
the country. The violence against Rohingya Muslims is what UN called the ”textbook 
example of ethnic cleansing.”46 According to the Médecins Sans Frontières, half of the rape 
victims who arrive at the camps on the Bangladesh border are minors, some even under the 
age of 10.47 A study in 2009 analyzed 27 countries with on-going or recently-ended armed 
conflicts and found that war rape, which according to that study meant either widespread or 
brutal rapes, was omnipresent in all 27.48 Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, 
Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Peru, Sri Lanka… And the list goes on. This is the 
contemporary reality. Millions of people have been and are being raped in conflict.  
 
 
                                                
40 C. S. Snyder. On the Battleground of Women’s Bodies: Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Journal 
of Women and Social Work 2006, pp. 184-195. 
41 S. Clark Miller. Atrocity, Harm, and Resistance: A Situated Understanding of Genocidal Rape, in A. 
Veltman, K. J. Norlock (eds). Evil, Political Violence, and Forgiveness: Essays in Honor of Claudia 
Card. Lexington 2009, pp. 53-76.  
42 M. L. Leiby. Wartime sexual violence in Guatemala and Peru. International Studies Quarterly 2009, 
vol. 53, no. 2, p. 459. 
43 S. McCrummen. Prevalence of Rape in E. Congo Described as Worst in World. Washington Post 
Foreign Service 2007. Accessible: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801194.html (11.03.2018) 
44  UN official calls DR Congo rape capital of the world. BBC 2010. Accessible:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8650112.stm (20.03.2018) 
45 A. Peterman, et al. Estimates and determinants of sexual violence against women in the democratic 
republic of congo. American journal of public health 2011, vol. 101, no. 6, pp. 1060-1067. 
46 T. Khin. Rohingya: A Preventable Genocide Allowed to Happen. Insight Turkey 2017, vol. 19, no. 
4, pp.  43-53. 
47 F. MacGregor. Rohingya girls under 10 raped while fleeing Myanmar, charity says. The Guardian 
2017.  
48  K. Farr. Extreme war rape in today’s civil-war-torn states: A contextual and comparative 
analysis. Gender Issues  2009, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1-41. 
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Chapter	2.	The	phenomenon	of	rape	and	sexual	violence	as	a	tactic	
 
In this section, the phenomenology of rape and sexual violence as a tactic is subject to 
analysis. Rape and sexual violence as a tactic in this section depict those acts of sexual 
violence that are used as a tool, strategy or a means to commit core international crimes. That 
means that those acts are committed with a specific purpose. To understand what is tactical 
rape and what acts exactly constitutes rape the analysis will focus on three main facets to 
determine: (i) the context of the crimes; (ii) the nature of the crimes; and (iii) the motives for 
the crimes. By first the nature of tactical rape is subject to analysis in order to determine how 
exactly tactical rape takes place, what are the central characteristics, the tendencies etc. Then, 
the motives striving behind the crime i.e. the question why the crime of rape takes place, why 
it is used, what purpose(s) it serves. And thirdly, the context in which these crimes take place, 
so questions like where and on what circumstances will be analyzed. The analysis will rely 
mainly on the court practice, some supportive materials will be used from previous studies. 
Two cases from SCSL, three cases from ICC, nine cases from ICTR and 19 cases from ICTY, 
altogether 33 cases were chosen for current section’s analysis (see the list of cases in 
Appendix 1.). All of these cases were included in this study on the basis of whether the court 
documents included relevant descriptions of the nature, motive and/or context of the rapes 
occurred. For the distinction between rape and sexual violence to be clear, rape under this 
section means (unlawful) sexual penetration of body orifices.  
 
2.1.	The	nature		
 
Firstly, the data demonstrated some general tendencies that are applicable to describe the 
notion of tactical rape and its nature. However, the data revealed that every conflict had also 
its own specific ’handwriting’ in the sense that in every conflict there were certain 
peculiarities that were not visible in other conflicts. Firstly, the common tendencies will be 
explained and then country-specific tendencies will be subsequently argued.  
 
Two main characteristics prevail that differentiate tactical rape from rape crimes committed 
for sexual gratification – the gravity of violence and the degree of humiliation. The author is 
not contending that these things do not occur when sexual violence is perpetrated for sexual 
motives, though surely not that rapidly and with such scope, rather that these characteristics 
are particularly common in tactical rape cases and therefore constitute the essence of these 
crimes.  
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2.1.1.	The	violence	
 
The gravity of violence is not the same mainly since in rape cases for sexual motives, the 
violence is usually a means used for the rape, i.e. the violence is used just as much as needed 
to coerce a person or to force a person into the sexual act. And sometimes the threat of 
violence is already enough to meet the ends. With tactical rape, the violence is often used as a 
second tool together with rape to inflict more pain and suffering for the victim, to humiliate 
more. It is common that victims are severely beaten before, during or after the rape. Biting 
and pinching49 were also reported. In the Zelenovic case one victim, who was repeatedly 
raped, in one of those instances was raped by at least ten soldiers in turn. The rape was so 
violent that the victim lost consciousness.50 In Rwanda the beatings and cutting (usually with 
a machete) were commonplace. In Kajelijeli case a mother witnessed her 15-year-old 
handicapped daughter raped by many different perpetrators. The mother was beaten until she 
lost consciousness and when she regained consciousness, her daughter’s dead body was 
covered with blood.51 Another witness described how she was beaten and then raped by at 
least six people before she lost consciousness.52 Throughout these cases a pattern of a kind 
came evident – these victims were often raped and sexually assaulted until they collapsed in a 
state of exhaustion.  
 
Beside beating, biting, stabbing and cutting, some witnesses’ reported incidences of piercing 
victims’ sexual organs using a spear, cutting off the breasts or other body parts of the victims, 
such as in Muhimana where the rape victim’s legs and arms were cut off and she was left to 
die a slow and painful death.53 In Musema one witness stated that during the rape they cut her 
head and shoulder with a machete and she was kicked in the stomach.54 In AFRC case one of 
the victims died from the gang-rape due to excessive bleeding.55 The violence is used together 
with the rape (and also separately) just to cause as much pain and suffering to the victims as 
                                                
49 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Trial Judgment), IT-96-23-T 
& IT-96-23/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22.02.2001, para. 
328. 
50  Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenovic (Sentencing Judgment), IT-96-23/2-S, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 4.04.2007, para-s. 21, 38. 
51  The Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-98-44A-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 1.12.2003, para. 638. 
52 Ibid, para. 654. 
53 The Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana (Judgement and Sentence), ICTR- 95-1B-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 28.04.2005, para. 359. 
54 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Judgement and Sentence), ICTR-96-13-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 27.01.2000, para. 835. 
55 The Prosecutor vs. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (the AFRC 
Accused), SCSL-04-16-T, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 20.06.2007, para. 1023. 
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possible. The Prosecution also brought that out in the Celebici case: ”The Prosecution 
contends, inter alia, that Hazim Delić personally participated in monstrous crimes. He 
murdered a number of detainees, he brutally raped a number of the women in the prison- 
camp and then boasted about it, and he frequently beat detainees, often using a baseball bat, 
causing his victims to suffer broken ribs. The Prosecution submits that he took a sadistic 
pleasure in the infliction of pain, for example, when he used an electrical device to shock 
detainees, he would laugh in response to pleas for mercy from the victims.”56  Though all, 
vaginal, anal and oral penetration were traumatizing and also painful for the victims, it was 
clear that the most cruel and painful way to penetrate was anally. All of the rapes that 
included anal penetration also included at least vaginal penetration and sometimes oral too. 
There was no separate incident of rape by anal penetration (expect in male rape cases). The 
victims reported extreme pain, bleeding and permanent physical damages caused by the anal 
penetration.57 
 
In the RUF case, an expert witness TF1-081 testified that between March and December 1999 
she examined 1,168 patients. 99% of these patients were abducted after the invasion on the 
6th of January 1999. 58,5% (648) had been subject to rape, some by more than two and even 
up to 30 men; 24,1% (281) complained of vaginal discharge, 27.9% had pelvic inflammatory 
disease (both are transmitted through sexual intercourse), over 17% were pregnant. Also 
noteworthy that 80% of the patients were girls between the ages 14 to 18.58  
 
As inserting objects into the vagina and anus of the victims and also raping the victims with 
objects was not common in the Balkans (at least not according to the selected cases), it was 
part of the ”handwriting” in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Half of the ICTR and SCSL cases 
included witness statements about the occurrence. In Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi the accused 
travelled in a caravan of vehicles and announced via megaphone: ”Hutu that save Tutsi should 
be killed Tutsi girls that have always refused to sleep with Hutu should be raped and sticks 
placed in their genitals.”59 Inserting sharpened sticks into the private parts of the victims was 
also present in the RUF, Muhimana and Kajelijeli case. In Prosecutor v. Musema the witness 
                                                
56 Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic aka "Pavo", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka "Zenga", Zejnil Delalic 
(Trial Judgement), IT-96-21-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), 16.11.1998, para. 1254. 
57 See examples, Mucic, para-s. 964, 1263; Furundzija para-s. 46, 87; Kunarac, para. 170; Bemba, 
para. 466. 
58 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (the RUF accused) (Trial 
judgment), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2.3.2009, para. 1520. 
59 The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (Annex II: The Indictment to Trial Judgement), ICTR-
2001-64-I, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 17.06.2004, para. 39. 
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J testified that this method was used to torture the victims to death. As she explained, men 
struck sharpened sticks into the private parts of the female victims while they were alive. The 
victims were screaming. Most were killed with the sticks. Those, who somehow survived, 
were then killed with clubs or machetes. She also witnessed her daughter being murdered in 
that way.60 In Gacumbitsi a young Tutsi woman explained how a group of about thirty 
attackers assaulted her mother, they drove a wooden stick into her mother’s genitals right 
through her head. Then the same attackers raped her and after that forced a branch slightly 
longer than a meter into her genitals. This wounded her and caused her to bleed excessively.61   
 
Mutilation was also something that was more common to Rwanda, though, some form of 
sexual mutilation was present in two ICTY cases. In the Milošević case witness B 1461 
explained that they were forced to bite off and swallow genitalia of other victims.62 In Tadic 
case, similar statements were made where Witness H and Witness G were forced to bite off 
the testicles of another male detainee.63 In Sierra Leone, the sexual violence was combined 
with sexual mutilations. The rebels were also cutting the private parts of both female and male 
civilians with a knife.64 
 
2.1.2.	The	humiliation	
 
One thing to say is that these crimes occur in a systematic way. Though the prevalence and 
the systemic way of committing these crime is in some sense more illustrating the context in 
which the tactical rape occurs, at the same time it does also illustrate the idea that most of 
these individual counts of rapes are part of the bigger picture. This means that it is rarely the 
case of an opportunistic person using the possibilities of conflict situation to commit crimes 
such as rape. Rather it is a common tool or practice. Beside excessive violence there is also 
the astonishing degree of humiliation and degradation the rape as a tactic often encompasses. 
This is strongly tied to the motive since by analyzing the common tendencies of rape it was 
clear that humiliation is one of the main goals of rape. Degrading treatment and humiliation 
during rape was present in most of the cases. While one thing is that such personal violation 
                                                
60 Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, para. 834. Prosecutor v. Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, para. 
396. 
61 Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, para-s. 207-208. 
62 The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic (IT-02-54), ICTY. Transcript 6.5.2003, p. 20222.  Accessible: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/030506IT.htm (01.03.2018). 
63 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Trial Opinion and Judgement), IT-94-1-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 7.05.1997, para-s. 198, 206. 
64 Prosecutor v. Sesay, supra note 58, para. 1208. 
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as rape is anyhow considerably humiliating, in Bosnia there also appeared discriminatory 
comments such as ”I want to see how muslim women fuck”65 and ”you should enjoy being 
fucked by a serb;”66  
 
In couple of ICTY cases, victims reported that the perpetrators ejaculated over their bodies 
after the rape.67 In these cases, it was visible that ejaculation was done in a way that would 
humiliate the victim even more. For instance, in Bralo, the perpetrator rape the victims in 
front of a number of people repeatedly, bit her and repeatedly ejaculated over her body. It was 
done in a demeaning manner. The Trial Chamber considered this exacerbated humiliation and 
degradation of the victim to be of aggravating gravity of an already serious offence: “These 
actions demonstrate a desire to debase and terrify a vulnerable woman, who was at the 
complete mercy of her captors. It is therefore incumbent upon the Trial Chamber to take into 
account these particular circumstances as having aggravated the gravity of his rape of Witness 
A.”68  
 
Another way perpetrators made to humiliate the victims was forcing the victims to lick the 
perpetrator’s penis clean after being anally raped.69 In another case, the perpetrators forced a 
couple to have sexual intercourse in the presence of other civilians and their own daughter. 
After the enforced rape the perpetrators forced the man’s daughter to wash her father’s penis 
clean.70 Both of those were done in front of an audience, including soldiers and civilians. The 
public humiliation element was present in all conflicts analyzed here. In many cases, there 
were reports that other civilians were forced to watch the rapes, beatings and other forms of 
sexual violence. In the RUF case, men with guns ordered witness TF1-217 to watch and count 
the men raping his wife. Children were also forced to watch. After his wife was raped by 
eight fighters, they stabbed and killed her.71  These actions were clearly motivated by 
domination and control. Showing the men that we can rape and kill your wives in front of 
your children, your communities, and nothing you can do about it. These acts have nothing to 
                                                
65 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin (Trial Judgement), IT-99-36-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1.09.2004, para. 513. 
66 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Trial Judgment), IT-96-23-T 
& IT-96-23/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22.02.2001, para. 
342. 
67 Prosecutor v. Bralo, para-s. 15, 34. Prosecutor v. Mucic, para-s. 958, 960, 961. 
68 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo (Sentencing Judgment), IT-95-17-S, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 7.12.2005, para. 34. 
69 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10.12.1998, para-s. 87, 266. 
70 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, supra note 58, para. 1302. 
71 Ibid, para-s. 1194, 1195. 
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do with sexual motives, but everything to do with power. And this kind of humiliation is, 
unfortunately as became evident from these cases, probably one of the most efficient ways of 
depriving the power and the will to fight back. Their goal is to instil fear, powerlessness and 
the sense of insecurity among the people. This is how they seize their power.  
 
After being raped, two Tutsi girls were taken outside of the house (naked) and other civilians 
were invited to come and see how naked Tutsi girl looks like. The girls, they had to spread 
their legs apart and wait there, guns aiming at them, people looking, mocking. “Everyone 
passing should see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman looks like.”72 The public element is 
what has been firmly made use of by the perpetrators in most of the cases. And usually, the 
public element is what made the event the most degrading for the victims.   
 
While inserting objects as a pattern was already explained during the previous section, 
causing pain and suffering was not the only objective for its use. The practice was exercised 
so widely since beside the physical suffering it was also degrading and humiliating for the 
victims. In Gacumbitsi it was the most obvious that raping and inserting sticks into the private 
parts of the victims is a deliberate and concerted campaign against (Tutsi) women since the 
accused agitated others to pursue with the practice. In one case it was reported that the men 
inserted a pistol into the vagina of one of the females. The weapon was left there overnight. 
As this might be done for inflicting pain, the female was not allowed to move or take the 
weapon out, it does seem more about humiliating the victim in this case.73 
 
There was also evidence of male rape occurring – something that has gone greatly 
unacknowledged. While it was not as often reported as female rape and we do not have the 
estimates of the prevalence, these cases of male rape are extremely degrading by nature and 
therefore make it understandable why the victims do not wish to disclose. In the Bemba case, 
the witness P23 explained that he was anally gang-raped by three soldiers, in front of his 
family members and neighbour. He was left both with physical and mental harm, since people 
in his community disrespect him due to the rape. He considered that he is a ”dead man” 
because of what happened to him.74 In ICTY sexual violence against men was thorougly 
discussed in Tadic and Milošević cases. In the latter case, there was this whole new dimension 
of sexual violence as a tool explored that was not in any other case before discussed. The case 
                                                
72 Muhimana, supra note 53, para. 265. 
73 Sesay, supra note 58, para. 1208. 
74  Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Trial Judgement), ICC-01/05-01/08, International 
Criminal Court (ICC), 21.03.2016, para. 494.  
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included male rape, forced oral sex, forced incest, gang rapes and sexual mutilation (as 
explained previously). Witness B-1461 explained in his testimony that fathers and sons were 
singled out by forcing people to align and to identify those of common descent. The names 
were recorded and as the close relations were identified, fathers and sons were forced to pair 
up and in front of others, to strip, and perform oral sex to each other. Fathers were the first to 
perform fellatio to their sons, and after that the sons had to do the same thing to their fathers. 
Altogether around twenty men had to go through this treatment, at the same time, other men 
in the building were ordered to watch what was going on on the stage.75 Male rape (and 
sexual violence) is even more stigmatized and therefore unfortunately notably under-reported.  
 
2.1.3.	Other	patterns	
 
In addition to the violence and humiliation, in these cases, rape is often committed in a form 
of a gang-rape. From 19 of the ICTY cases analyzed at least in 9 cases there was evidence of 
gang-rapes. In ICTR at least 8/9 cases were gang-rapes and all of the analyzed ICC and SCSL 
cases included gang-rapes. And what makes it even more inhumane, that no one was safe. As 
discussed above victims were both male and female. One witness explained that she was 
heavily pregnant and was raped by penetration so brutally that she vomited during the 
incident.76 From these 33 case-studies, at least one more pregnant women was reported raped 
and afterwards stabbed to death. The woman was eight months pregnant at the time.77 
 
According to the cases, victims were also handicapped people, elderly and even children. In 
Trnopolje camp even girls 16 to 17 were raped.78 In another case, it was reported that one of 
the girls who was raped constantly over the period of a couple of weeks was a twelve-year-old 
girl.79 A 15-year-old girl was raped during an interrogation after three soldiers accused her of 
not telling the truth.80 In Rwanda children as rape victims were nothing new. The youngest 
reported victim was a six-year-old girl who was raped by three Interahamwe when they came 
                                                
75 Transcript of Slobodan Milosevic Trial, supra note 62, pp. 20221-20223. 
76 The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (Trial Judgement), ICTR-2001-64-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 17.06.2004, para. 203. 
77 Musema, supra note 54, para. 833. 
78 Prosecutor v. Brđanin (Trial Judgement), IT-99-36-T, International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1.09.2004, para. 514. 
79 Prosecutor v. Momćilo Krajišnik (Trial Judgement), IT-00-39-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 27.09.2006, para. 641. 
80 Zelenovic, supra note 50, para. 22. 
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to kill her father.81 In Sierra Leone, many witnesses reported that even nine to ten years old 
girls were raped.82  
 
When it comes to perpetrators, they were almost solely men. Still, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko is 
the first ever woman being prosecuted and found guilty of sexual violence by an international 
criminal court or tribunal. Somehow women are not expected to fit the image of a sex 
offender. However, Nyiramasuhuko was convicted by ICTR on sexual violence charges. 
Women are also involved as perpetrators of sexual violence. Though most cases have never 
been (and probably never will be) judged in international courts and tribunals, female 
perpetrators is not a singular thing.83 Victimization by female perpetrators is more common 
than we could expect. A study showed that female perpetrator of sexual violence was reported 
by 40 per cent of the female survivors and 10 per cent of the male survivors.84 This one-
dimensional gender-bias that females are practically never playing a role in mass atrocities, 
particularly in sexual violence, is a dangerous discourse. While feeding those gendered 
normative assumptions about human behavior, we create a flawed perception of the reality 
which in turn can undermine bringing justice and fighting impunity. Whether this bias had the 
effect on the definitions of rape crime will be discussed in Chapter IV.  
 
Thus, rape as a tactic by its nature is a extremely brutal and violent act, often taking place in a 
form of a gang-rape, with a high prevalence of repeatedness and with a special purpose of 
humiliation and degradation. Victims are both male and female, regardless of age.   
 
2.2.	The	motives		
 
With this phenomenon the sexual motives in most cases seem to be secondary if not 
irrelevant. Though, in Bemba the Court stipulated that some MLC soldiers considered the 
victims to be ”war booty,”85 spoils of war, so to speak. There might be some differences 
between the commission of rape when it is done with the underlying ideology that victims are 
                                                
81 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 2.09.1998, para. 416. Accessible: http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/ictr-
96-4 (01.03.2018). 
82 Sesay, supra note 58, para. 992. Brima, supra note 55, para. 591. 
83 A. Smeulers. Female Perpetrators: Ordinary or Extra-ordinary Women? International criminal law 
review 2015, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 223-224. 
84 L. Lawry, K. Johnson, J. Asher. Evidence-based documentation of gender-based violence. In Sexual 
violence as an international crime: Interdisciplinary approaches. Intersentia Ltd 2013, pp. 300-301. 
85  Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Trial Judgement), ICC-01/05-01/08, International 
Criminal Court (ICC), 21.03.2016, para. 567. 
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”war booty” and when its a tactic of war. The former does carry more of sexual motives, 
whereas the latter is of tool to humiliate and to destroy etc. However, such stipulation was 
evident only in one case out of 33 included in the analysis. In most cases, it was about power 
and control. In some cases the purpose of rape was expressly stated, e.g. the Kunarac himself 
expressed the view of rape as a mechanism for power and control by stating that raping 
Muslim women is their way to affirm domination and superiority over the Muslims.86 
Though, in this case it was more about ethnicity than gender, the same logic about asserting 
superiority follows in other conflicts.  
 
The inescapable reality is that rape in the context of international crimes is (mainly) used as a 
weapon against civilians to destroy both individuals and communities. When analyzing these 
cases, some patterns formed out. The main reasons rape was used are the following (in 
random order): (i) to obtain information (as some rapes were committed during or as part of 
an interrogation); (ii) to coerce the victims into performing certain acts or refraining from 
certain acts (e.g. to co-operate, to provide information, forced labor, not to rebel, not to escape 
etc.); (iii) to punish the victims (e.g. in the Mucic et al. Case, where the victim was raped to 
punish her for the acts of her husband); (iv) to intimidate the victims by creating the 
atmosphere of fear and powerlessness; (v) to destroy (individuals, communities, will to live or 
to fight back etc.). In the Akayesu case, a mother begged soldiers not to rape her daughters in 
front of her, rather kill them instead. The man replied that ”the principle was to make them 
suffer,”  thus they raped the girls in an atrocious manner, mocking and taunting them (in front 
of their mother).87 It was clear that their goal was to cause as much mental distress and 
degrading treatment as possible.    
 
When discussing the country-specific patterns some observations can be made. The rapes in 
Rwanda and Bosnia are certainly rather distinct by motive. The rapes in Bosnia were used to 
impregnate women so they would carry a baby of enemy’s ethnicity and therefore the rapes 
did not include the same degree of humiliation as in Rwanda. The rapes of women were more 
about the prevention of births within a particular ethnic group. In Rwanda, the intention to 
destroy Tutsis by raping them was linked to a high degree of humiliation and it was more 
about demoralizing and destroying the collectives of people with the humiliation and stigma 
around being a victim of rape. However, the male rape in Bosnia was more similar to what 
was happening in Rwanda since the idea was to weaken and demoralize the male victims. It 
                                                
86 Krajišnik, supra note 79, para. 640. 
87 Akayesu, supra note 81, para. 430. 
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had nothing to do with sexual motives since in most cases male detainees were forced to 
perform sexual acts to other detainess and the perpetrators were not physically involved in 
male rape.  
 
In Sierra Leone the brutality of rapes were of similar kind to Rwanda since using objects to 
commit rape or inserting objects to humiliate and cause pain was frequent in both cases. 
When in Rwanda and Bosnia the motives of sexual violence, rape in particular, was quite 
clear, in Sierra Leone it is more complex. Sexual violence and specifically the chosen acts of 
sexual violence were often sporadic and irregular in the sence that there was no consistent 
pattern unlike with other two examples. Not arguing that sexual violence was not committed 
in a widespread or systematic way, it was both. But when looking at their specific methods it 
seems like this was a concerted campaign with the specific goal to terrorize. Thus, it was not 
about destroying a group, not about getting women pregnant, but specifically terrorizing the 
whole community by a weapon of sexual violence. Many women were raped in front of their 
families and then killed. But the family members were often left alive. This is clearly to 
terrorize, to instil fear among the community. As male and female captives were paired up 
and forced to have sexual intercourse, this is for humiliation, a game of power and 
dominance. Brutal gang rapes against both women and men. Inserting objects into genitalia. 
Capturing civilians and making them sexual slaves. And a distinct feature of Sierra Leone was 
the amputation of hands, usually by machete. As amputation was often done after rape, the 
soldiers were trying to cause as much pain and suffering as possible, but still left some 
victims alive. For they to suffer. So, in Sierra Leone the motives were mainly about 
intimidation, furthering dominance and control over people, undermining the relationships in 
community by creating an atmosphere of brutal violence and oppression.  
 
In Kenya, the rapes were targeted against a specific group – perceived Organge Democratioc 
Movement (ODM) supporters. It was part of post-election violence. Thus, the motives for 
these rapes were of persecution and punishment of certain civilians. Thereby, there exist some 
general motives of rape and sexual violence being used as a tool, but every conflict has its 
own distinctiveness in both the commence of rape (and sexual violence) and the specific 
motives. 
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2.3.	The	context		
 
The court has previously stated that coercive environment can also be taken into account, 
thus, we can also look at the larger context where these crimes happen. The doctrine of the 
coercive environment is a vital necessity for the victims since they do not have to prove their 
own lack of consent and the circumstances that are being taken into account go beyond the 
individual’s psychic space. This means that there have to be circumstances established that 
create the inherent compulsion. The courts have held that wartime-like circumstances equal to 
coercive circumstances.88 In Akayesu the Court considered some key factors about the 
coercive environment: (i) the number of individuals effectively supporting the sexual 
encounter; (ii) whether the incident immediately followed a situation involving combat; 
and (iii) the brandishing and/or usage of weaponry.89 There is no one and clear definition of 
coercive environment, international courts and tribunals have relied on broad statements of 
the context, as e.g. that in cases of war crimes or crimes against humanity the circumstances 
will be almost universally coercive.90  
 
When analyzing these cases the context was clearly coercive. ”Reliable documentary 
evidence from several sources estimates that up to five thousand civilians were killed, one 
hundred had limbs amputated, thousands were raped, thousands were abducted, civilians were 
used by rebels as human shields and entire neighbourhoods were burnt to the ground, often 
with civilians inside their houses.”91 In Sesay the Court confirmed that sexual violence was 
spreading in an uncontrollable manner, it was targeted against the civilian population in an 
atmosphere of violence, oppression and lawlessness. Sexual violence was used as a weapon of 
terror against the female population. It was carried out in calculated and coordinated manner. 
The perpetrators employed perverse methods of sexual violence against men and women of 
all ages.92 Thus, these rapes happened in a planned manner, in a  systematic way. Most of the 
rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda happened either in a widespread or systematic context or in the 
context of a genocide.  
 
Beside the larger context, we can also observe a bit closer the atmosphere and setting in 
which these rapes occurred. In Krstic the atmosphere was described by explaining that people 
                                                
88 Prosecutor v. Kunarac (Appeals Judgement), IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 12.06.2002, para-s. 129-130. 
89 Akayesu, supra note 81,  para-s. 688, 692, 693.  
90 Kunarac, supra note 49, para. 130. 
91 Brima, supra note 55, para. 236. 
92 Sesay, supra note 58, para. 1347. 
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nearby could see the rape, but could do nothing about it because of the military presence. 
People were too scared. You could hear women screaming or see them being dragged away 
for rapes. And many were so terrified that they committed suicide by hanging themselves. 
Throughout the night and early the next morning, stories about the rapes and killings that 
happened, spread through the camp and the terror escalated.93 Rape was commonplace 
throughout the camps during the Balkan war. Detainees were humiliated, threatened, beaten, 
females were called out by camp guards to be raped, people were forced to perform sexual 
acts on each other while others were watching, also it was announced that mothers and 
daughters would be raped publicly.94 In detention centers, there were extremely poor hygienic 
conditions, insufficient food supplies and no medical care. And while being held in inhumane 
living conditions, victims were beaten, raped, killed, and subject to psychological abuse.95 
People fought like animals over bread, licked the walls to get water from condensation, some 
started to hallucinate or became mentally disturbed due to living conditions. When women 
tried to seek protection from police, their complaints were ignored. And when they sought 
refuge from police, they were subject to more violence.96  
 
Thereby we can state that the context where rape as a tool for group-coercion happens is 
almost always different from the context in which sexual violence for sexual gratification 
happens. One thing is that most of these rapes are committed in war or in the context of 
genocide, or in a widespread or systematic manner. Thus, the victims often reasonably foresee 
their chances of getting raped since it is so prevalent. And beside the larger context looking 
closer at the setting, it is clear that the living conditions in some cases already cause fear and 
terror. This phenomenon explained is not a crime taking place at the individual’s psychic 
space. It is rather an extenstion of war on the bodies of the victims.  
 
 
 
                                                
93 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (Trial Judgement), IT-98-33-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 02.08.2001, para. 46. 
94 Brđanin, supra note 78, para-s. 518, 845, 847, 1018. 
95 Krajišnik, supra note 79, para. 1150. 
96 Ibid, para. 640. 
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PART	II.	INTERNATIONAL	JURISPRUDENCE	OF	RAPE	AND	SEXUAL	
VIOLENCE	
 
When rape cases are tried, rape laws are created or applied, communities rethink what rape is. 
Contextual and empirical presumptions impact what we consider about the forms and 
prevalence of force in sexual interactions. This influences the public consciousness and 
judicial determinations of law and fact. International legal developments over the issue of 
rape and sexual violence are truly significant since they also send a message to the wider 
audience than just those closely affected, that international community is decisive about 
certain behavior that we deem unacceptable. The definition of rape circles around force and 
unwanted sexual intercourse. The emphasis tends to be on either compulsion or lack of 
agreement. Force abrogates autonomy.97 The goal of this part of the thesis is to determine the 
jurisprudence of rape and sexual violence in international criminal law, i.e. how the crime of 
rape is regulated under international law, how it is prosecuted by international courts and 
tribunals, and in the last chapter the definition of rape in international criminal law is subject 
to analysis. The goal is to establish how rape is defined in practice and what are the elements 
of the crime. While it is clear that with addressing sexual violence the compromise must be 
made between the rights of the victims and witnesses, the rights of the accused and the needs 
of the international community as a whole, equity is hard to reach. The data from the previous 
chapter is an important determinant of whether the nature, motives and the context of rape as 
a tactic have been taken into account while fighting impunity and offering protection and 
acknowledgement to all victims.  
 
Chapter	3.	The	prosecution	of	rape	and	sexual	violence	in	international	
criminal	law	
 
It was during the 20th century when international jurisprudence came to recognize rape and 
other crimes of sexual violence as part of international law. Currently, the crime of rape under 
the international criminal law is explicitly stated in the law. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes 
explicitly enlist rape, which means these specifically classify rape as a crime, give it the same 
gravity as murder, enslavement etc., and relieve the memory of law which held that rape is 
                                                
97 C. A. Mackinnon. Defining rape internationally: a comment on Akayesu. Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 2005, vol. 44, no. 940, pp. 940-958. 
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something of a honor violation. The ICTR Statute Art 3 (1) (g) claims that ICTR shall have 
the power to prosecute people who have committed a crime against humanity of rape and rape 
as a war crime. Under ICTY Statute rape is explicitly mentioned in Art 5 which also regards 
crime against humanity of rape. The Rome Statute mentions the crime of rape under crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. Rape is not a free-standing crime and can only be 
prosecuted as an act of war, genocide, or crime against humanity.  This means that for rape to 
be prosecuted at all, firstly the general ingredients proper to each category of crime (e.g. 
genocide) and then the specific ingredients of the sub-class crime (e.g. rape) must be 
fulfilled.98 This means that international law determines which instances of rape count as 
international crimes, but this also makes a statement about which rape does not count.99 
Simply accepting the crime of rape as part of the international criminal law does not do 
justice. The lack of coherence and clear consensus on international arena undermines the aim 
of the acknowledgement. The ICC and the ad hoc tribunals have had extensive practice on 
prosecuting sexual violence, e.g. only in ICTY 48% of the individuals had charges of sexual 
violence included in their indictments. Current chapter will demonstrate what the practice of 
international courts and tribunals is stipulating about how rape and sexual violence is 
prosecuted, what requirements must be fulfilled for that and how the practice has evolved. 
 
3.1.	Rape	as	a	crime	against	humanity	
 
In 1998 in Furundzija it was stated that when rape fulfills the threshold criteria it may also 
amount to a violation of the laws and customs of war, grave breach of the Geneva Convention 
or an act of genocide.100 When the crime is committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, rape among other acts enlisted in Art 7 of the 
Rome Statute, may constitute crimes against humanity. Beside rape, Art 7(g) includes sexual 
slavery, enforced sterilization, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity as possible means for committing crimes against 
humanity. The nexus with armed conflict is not required. The physical element must include 
grave forms of sexual violence, the contextual element means that it must be committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population and the 
means rea requires the knowledge of the attack. Rape as a crime against humanity does not 
                                                
98 A. Cassese. The statute of the international criminal court: some preliminary reflections. European 
Journal of International Law 1999, vol. 10, p. 148. 
99 K. C. Richey. Several steps sideways: international legal developments concerning war rape and the 
human rights of women. Texas Journal of Women and the Law 2007, vol. 17, no. 109, p. 119. 
100 De Than and Shorts, p. 104. 
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acknowledge an individual violation of the autonomy and integrity of one’s body, one’s 
humanity, instead it must be proven to be committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack on a civilian population – that means it is prima facie established in a violation of 
humanity as collective.101  
 
The Akayesu case defined rape as a crime against humanity when firstly, the rapes were 
committed (i) as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (ii) on a civilian population; and 
(iii) on certain catalogued discriminatory ground(s), i.e. national, ethnic, political, racial, or 
religious grounds.102 For rape to be considered as widespread it must be large scale, massive, 
recurrent or continuous action, carried out collectively with considerable serious 
consequences and is directed against a cluster of victims.103  For rape to qualified as 
systematic, it must be “organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common 
policy involving substantial public or private resources.” This policy needs not to be formal, 
but can be some form of a preconceived plan.104 And lastly, the elements of the rape crime 
must also be fulfilled. This means that rape is not committed under orders or committed with 
no discriminatory basis do not fall under this category. Thus, the defence called witnesses 
who explained that in their opinion the rapists were more about satisfying their own sexual 
needs, there was no intent to destroy Tutsis but rather to have sexual intercourse with 
beautiful women, so the defence was trying to play the spontaneous act of desire card which 
intended to prove that there was no racial or genocidal intent accompanying the rapes.105 This 
did not work and both the general and specific elements were proven.  Thus, under the 
international criminal law, it is necessary to prove that rape does not occur occasionally or 
spontaneously during war by opportunistic people on personal motives but to distinguish 
those from rape as a crime against humanity. 
  
In SCSL in the case of Sesay et al., where the accused were charged with rape as a crime 
against humanity, the Chamber cared to explain that since during armed conflicts where rapes 
occur on a large scale, there are specific circumstances. By that, the Court meant the strong 
social stigma in certain societies and since the elements of the crime are difficult to satisfy, 
circumstantial evidence may be used to demonstrate the actus reus of the rape.106 This is also 
an important development supporting the victims since with rape crime, gathering direct 
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evidence is tricky, particularly forensic evidence, i.e. not all victims report rape, register their 
injuries through a doctor, not all victims are left alive, and the shame and stigmatization is 
often that strong that seeking justice is more of a punishment for the victim. As stated, the 
crime of rape as crimes against humanity with its complexity in elements is rather difficult to 
establish. Rape as a crime against humanity has been tried in all of the courts included in the 
analysis.107 
 
3.1.1.	Other	inhumane	acts	
 
The offence of other inhumane acts is a residual clause that covers a broad range of 
underlying acts that are not explicitly enumerated as a list. This is material since we cannot 
predict the future of crimes against humanity in that sense that we could determine with 
certainty all the possible acts and provide the necessary protection. The more specific we get, 
the more restrictive we get. As other inhumane acts is a crime against humanity, this means 
the act must be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population. The conduct must be of similar gravity and seriousness as other prohibited crimes 
against humanity, the act must be carried out intentionally and the perpetrator must be aware 
of the factual circumstances and intended to inflict serious bodily or mental harm. Previous 
charges of other inhumane acts have included e.g. rape, mutilation, sexual violence, forced 
marriage, forced prostitution and forced nudity.108 
 
In Brima the Chamber stipulated that since in their statute an exhaustive category of sexual 
crimes is particularised, thus the offence of other inhumane acts, though residual, must 
”logically be restrictively interpreted as applying to only acts of a non-sexual nature 
amounting to an affront to human dignity.”109 The jurisprudence of other tribunals has not 
given that strong support to that other inhumane acts should be confined to acts only of a non-
sexual nature. In the Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, the Pre-Trial Chamber explained that other 
inhumane acts is a residual category of crimes in the system of art. 7(1) of the Statute (crimes 
against humanity), thus if a conduct could be charged as another crime specified under the 
provision of crimes against humanity, it would be impermissible to charge it as other 
inhumane acts. According to the Elements of the Crimes and the fundamental principles of 
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criminal law, this residual category of crimes against humanity must be interpreted in a 
conservative, not broad manner.110  
 
The case of Prosecutor v. Tadic was the first case before the ICTY, and the accused was 
found guilty of other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity and a cruel treatment as a 
war crime. Though these charges encompassed forcing a male detainee to perform fellatio on 
another detainee and biting off his testicles. 111  The indictment nor the judgment 
acknowledged the sexual nature of the offences but identified it as cruel treatment and 
inhumane act. Yet, this is not the only example. Cases of men being subject to crimes of 
sexual nature have included genital mutilation, forced oral sex, other forced sexual acts, blunt 
trauma to genitals, rape etc. Though not all crimes related to e.g. genitals are not necessarily 
crimes of sexual nature (e.g. blunt force trauma to genitals can be an act of violence without 
any sexual reference), the question remains – why in some cases of rape the label is of other 
inhumane acts instead of a label that would reflect the sexual nature of the crime? The 
reasoning on under which label to prosecute remains unclear since there is no general rule to 
this.112 Though in order to ensure the fair application of the label, some guidelines about the 
reasoning of choosing the ’correct’ label would be beneficial, yet the author does not support 
that there ought to be more restrictions since this could impede justice. 
 
3.2.	Rape	as	a	war	crime		
 
There does not exist one single document in international law that codifies all war crimes. 
Lists of war crimes can be found in both international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law treaties, as well as in international customary law. Art. 8 of the Rome Statute 
enumerates quite the list of war crimes. War crimes are violations of international 
humanitarian law that incur individual criminal responsibility under international law. In 
contrast to genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes must take place in the context 
of an armed conflict (either international or non-international). The nexus with the armed 
conflict is vital to set apart a war crime from a purely domestic offence.113 The Rome statute 
categorizes war crimes as: (i) Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, related to 
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international armed conflict; (ii) other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict; (iii) serious violations of Article 3 common to the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions, related to armed conflict not of an international character; (iv) other 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international 
character. The conflicts in Rwanda and in Bosnia were of such magnitude that these received 
the attention of the international community, henceforth rape was viewed as a method of 
warfare and was acknowledged as a war crime by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in 
the late 1990s.  
 
Art. 8(2)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the Rome Statute, which are torture or inhumane treatment and 
wilfully causing great suffering cover rape by implication. Rape and sexual violence are 
specifically mentioned in Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute.114 However, as the para. 1 of 
the Art. 8 states, the Court shall have jurisdiction over war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy of a large-scale commission of such crimes.115 This does 
not mean that these are jurisdictional prerequisites of elements for prosecuting war crimes, but 
rather the factors that are to be taken into account by the prosecutor when considering 
whether to open investigations.116 
 
The contextual element of war crimes means that the crimes are committed in the context of 
an international/non-international armed conflict and the conduct was associated with the 
context. The Appeals Chamber in Kunarac explained that war crime is shaped by or 
dependent upon the environment, though it does not have to be planned or committed in the 
context of some form of policy.117 The mens rea requires the knowledge of both, the 
individual prohibited act and the contextual element. The victims can be non-combatants or 
combatants, wounded and sick members of the armed forces, prisoners of war and civilians, 
including medical and religious personnel, humanitarian workers and civil defence staff.118  
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The ICTY established a precedent over the issue of war rape. In Furundzija, the Trial 
Chamber stipulated, after brief historical reminder of the Lieber Code, Hague Convention IV, 
CCL, Tokyo Tribunal and Nuremberg Tribunal, that these have contributed to the evolution 
of universally accepted norms of international law prohibiting rape (as well serious sexual 
assault). The Appeals Chamber reaffirmed that rape has been recognized as a war crime by 
the international community for a long time.119 In Kunarac, where rape was prosecuted as a 
violation of the laws or customs of war, it was concluded by the Appeals Chamber that rape 
meets the requirements120 and constitutes a recognized war crime under the customary 
international law. The Chamber supported the conclusion ipso facto that rape is universally 
criminalised in domestic jurisdictions, explicitly prohibited in the IV Geneva Convention and 
in Additional Protocols I and II, and recognized as a serious offence in the jurisprudence of 
international bodies e.g. EC and Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.121 ICC dealt 
with an interesting precedent of war crimes of rape and sexual slavery of child soldiers in the 
case of Ntaganda. The Defence argued over the matter that war crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery cannot apply in case of being committed against the member of the same group as the 
perpetrator is and that such conclusion by the Trial Chamber is an unjustified extension of the 
scope of war crimes law. The Appeals Chamber, however, explained that Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) 
and (2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute does not provide expressis verbis that the victims of rape or 
sexual slavery must be ”protected persons” or ”persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities.” 122  Thus, there is no general rule in international humanitarian law that 
categorically excludes members of an armed group from protection against crimes committed 
by the members of the same armed group.123 For now, we just have to wait to see the outcome 
since this is another example of international courts solving the previously unanswered 
matters related to sexual violence in international criminal law.    
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3.2.1	Rape	as	torture		
 
Both the ICTY and ICTR have also prosecuted rape as a war crime of torture. The prohibition 
of torture is a ius cogens norm. Torture in armed conflict is specifically prohibited by 
international treaty law,124 though torture is prohibited both in times of peace and during an 
armed conflict. Under the international humanitarian law, the definitional elements of torture 
are not the same as under human rights law, particularly the presence of a state official or any 
other authority. The Trial Chamber in Kunarac explained that the elements of the offence of 
torture are: ”(i) the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental; (ii) the act or omission must be intentional; (iii) the act or omission must aim at 
obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a 
third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.”125  The 
acts that constitute torture are not expressly catalogued, thus it can be any act that causes 
severe pain or suffering, both physical or mental, and is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as mentioned. Rape can constitute torture. The Trial Chamber in the 
Furundzija concluded that Article 3 of the Statute covers torture and outrages upon personal 
dignity, including rape. Moreover, torture by means of rape is a particularly grave form of 
torture.126 For rape to be categorized as torture, both the elements of rape and the elements of 
torture must be fulfilled. Rape must be the tool to torture a person (e.g. to inflict severe pain 
or suffering).  
 
The ad hoc tribunals have not determined the absolute degree of pain required, but severe 
pain or suffering as a consequence of rape was accepted in many cases. In Akayesu 
judgement, the Chamber compared rape and torture and found that both are used for similar 
purposes, e.g. intimidation, punishment, humiliation etc., and in both matters it is a violation 
of personal dignity. According to the Court, rape constitutes torture when it is inflicted, 
instigated by a public official or a person in an official capacity.127 In Mucic et al. the Trial 
Chamber concluded that rape can be included within the offence of torture if it meets the 
elements of the offence. In Bosnia, rape as torture was employed to punish and/or intimidate 
the victims and their communities.128 The Court agreed that rape gives rise to pain and 
suffering and not just during the act, but the physical, psychological and social consequences 
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of rape must be analyzed.129  The Court further elaborated that the psychological suffering of 
the victim is often aggravated by the social and cultural conditions and therefore can have 
acute and long-lasting effect on the victim’s life.130 In Kvocka, the Chamber held that after 
considering the objective severity of the harm inflicted, subjective criteria will also be 
relevant for assessing the gravity of the harm (e.g. effect of the treatment upon the particular 
victim, victim’s age, gender, state of health).131 In Zelenović, e.g. a group of around 60 
Muslim women were arrested and taken to a detention center where these women were 
interrogated and threatened with sexual assault and murder. Some women were raped during 
the interrogations, sometimes gang-raped, sometimes more than on one occasion. The victims 
suffered unspeakable pain, repeated humiliation, intimidation and indignity. The victims were 
unarmed and defenceless, kept in harsh conditions for long periods of time. Most of the rapes, 
in that case, qualified for both, rape and torture. One of the most gruesome examples is 
witness 75, who was raped as a punishment after the interrogation by at least ten soldiers in 
turn in such a violent way that she lost consciousness.132  
 
3.3.	Genocidal	rape	
 
We cannot place all crimes on a continuum of seriousness or create a hierarchy of gravity, 
nonetheless, certain crimes are for a reason considered the ”crime of crimes.”133 Amongst the 
most heinous crimes against humanity is the crime of genocide. That is a systematic 
destruction of a protected group.134 The 1948 Genocide Convention Art. II defines genocide 
as an act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group.135 Five different categories of acts are listed, these are: (i) killing members 
of the group; (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (iii) 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (iv) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
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group; (v) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.136 According to Art. 1 
of the Genocide Convention, genocide can be committed both, during the time of war and 
peace.137 One that makes the crime of genocide different from other international crimes, is 
the dolus specialis – the genocidal intent. There must be evidence of the special intent to 
destroy a protected group in whole or in part.138 
 
Though none of the statutes explicitly acknowledge that rape can be a constituent part for 
committing genocide, rape can be used as a means to commit genocide and the practice of 
international tribunals support the notion. Genocidal rape is specifically rape under orders, it 
is rape under control – rape unto death, rape as a massacre, an instrument of destruction, to 
shatter a community, to eradicate people.139  
 
Though sometimes rape was a prelude to murder, sometimes the women were left alive so 
they would have to live with the humiliation.140 For example, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was 
reported to have ordered the soldiers: ”before you kill the women, you need to rape them.”141 
A witness in the same also stated that Nyiramasuhuko ordered the Interahamwe to kill men 
and rape women before killing them.142 Women were meant to suffer before they were killed. 
After raping and killing the woman, her naked body was often left there for others to see.143 
The strategic aims of leaving the victim of a targeted group alive, knowing that this makes the 
victim stigmatized, possibly ostracized by the community, possibly forced to exile - it shatters 
the community. In Akayesu the Chamber recognized that genocidal rape was one of the most 
effective and serious ways of inflicting injury and harm on Tutsi women, and this is what was 
advancing the destruction of the entire Tutsi group. Rapes resulted in physical and 
psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and the community they were part 
of.144 Women were left alive so they would bring humiliation to her family and close ones. 
Sexual violence was a tactic to bring about the destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and 
                                                
136 Ibid.  
137 Ibid. 
138  C. Tournaye. Genocidal Intent before the ICTY. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 2003, vol. 52, no. 2, p. 450. 
139 S. L. Russell-Brown. Rape as an act of genocide. Betkeley Journal of International Law 2003, vol. 
21, no. 2, pp. 350-374. 
140 Ibid. 
141 P. Landesman. A Woman’s Work. New York Times Magazine 2002.  
142  The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko (Appeal judgement), ICTR-98-42-A, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 14.09.2016, p. 184, footnote 1189. 
143 Human Rights Watch/Africa. Shattered lives: Sexual violence during Rwandan genocide and its 
aftermath. Human Rights Watch 1996. Accessible: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm 
(01.03.2018). 
144 Akayesu, supra note 81, para. 731. 
 36 
of life itself.145 It was evident from Akayesu, that in Rwanda, rape was seen worse than death 
since not only the victims begged to rather being killed than raped, but also the mother of the 
victims begged the same.146  
 
Rape was notably cost-effective because you only had to rape once and yet there were so 
many possibilities of outcomes, some more predictable, some less, but all the consequences 
served the purpose in one way or another. In the context of genocide with the intent to destroy 
a group of people in whole or in part rape served a purpose for instance when people, not just 
individuals, but the community felt shame afterwards. It made people want to leave and never 
return. Also, AIDS contracted through rape and the estimates of the prevalence are breath-
taking. According to Amnesty International only in Rwanda seven out of ten genocide rape 
survivors are living with HIV/Aids.147 As the report claims, rape as a tool for genocide is 
marking people for death.  
 
Akayesu judgement was not significant just for defining rape, but also finding that rape can be 
an actus reus of genocide. Rape was used as a tool of violence against a group with the intent 
to destroy that group in whole or in part.148 Beside using rape as means, other elements have 
to be fulfilled for an act to be considered as a crime under international criminal law, e.g. in 
case of the crime of genocide, the following elements also must be fulfilled: (i) the crime of 
rape is a committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (ii) on a civilian population; 
(iii) on exhaustive discriminatory grounds mentioned in ICTR Statute (national, ethnic, 
political, racial or religious grounds).149 As an example, Jean-Paul Akayesu was convicted of 
rape as a crime against humanity, and genocide, for which rape constituted a great part, since 
rape of Tutsi women was proven to be systematic and the victims were all only and solely 
Tutsi women. Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence just on the basis of being 
Tutsi.150 
 
However, the genocide committed in Rwanda and Bosnia are different by nature. Since in 
Bosnia, the rapes were used to impregnate women so they would carry a baby of enemy’s 
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ethnicity, it was more about the prevention of births within a particular ethnic group. Rape 
worked as a measure to prevent births not just by impregnating the women, but also by the 
fact that in case of Bosnia we are talking about a patriarchal society, membership of a group is 
determined by the identity of the father, thus raping and impregnating the woman, the child 
will not belong to its mother’s group. Also, rape victims are viewed as tarnished and unclean, 
not suitable for marriage nor carrying children anymore. In Rwanda, the rapes were to 
humiliate and demoralize. This shows that rape can be used as a versatile tool – by 
committing one act it will serve in many ways to achieve the desired aim.  
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Chapter	4.	The	definition	of	rape	and	sexual	violence	in	international	criminal	
law	
 
The crime of rape is specifically prohibited by treaty law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Additional Protocol II of 1977 prohibit rape at any time and 
in any place whatsoever. Yet, there is no definition of rape in international law. ICTY and 
ICTR have been the most mettlesome and made the most pivotal advancements regarding 
rape in conflict. These tribunals were not the first who convicted people for rape since Tokyo 
Tribunal also convicted perpetrators for committing the crime of rape,151 but rather the first 
international tribunals which gave close scrutiny to the issue of the definition of the crime. 
And since ICC and SCSL have also created their own definitions, the contribution of these 
institutions is also included in the analysis. 
 
4.1.	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	
 
It was in 1998 when the first case in the international arena, where the elements of rape were 
discussed. It was the case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu in ICTR and through a spontaneous 
testimony of a witness, who stated that her six-year-old daughter had been raped by three 
Interahamwe. The initial indictment, however, did not include sexual violence charges. So 
this testimony got Court’s attention. The Indictment was amended and additional charges 
were included. The Court even mentioned that they take note of the public concern for the 
historical exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence from the prosecution of war 
crime, but certainly now, the matter is in the interest of justice.152 The Court recognized rape 
as an extremely grave crime and that rape can be used to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity. This acknowledgement was the first crucial step. The Court stipulated that rape is 
”one of the worst ways of inflicting harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and 
mental harm.”153 The ICTR also agreed that there is no commonly accepted definition of the 
crime of rape under the international criminal law, therefore one must be created. The 
Chamber explained that in certain national jurisdictions rape has been defined as non-
consensual intercourse, but there have been variations on the act of rape since it may involve 
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insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices.154  
 
The Chamber stated that rape is a form of aggression and that it is not possible to derive the 
definition of the essential elements of the crime of rape just by the mechanical description of 
objects and body parts. It explained on the example of The Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) that it is the 
conceptual framework of state-sanctioned violence that must be centred, not cataloguing the 
specific acts. 155 Thus, the Trial Chamber used an analogy from torture and explained that rape 
should be defined by its purpose to the perpetrator in context, aligned with its specific nature 
as being sexual. This, however, is understandable due to the fact that the mechanical 
definition might not cover all possible conducts that it ought. In particular, since rape is not 
mainly used for sexual purposes but rather for degradation, intimidation, humiliation, 
punishment, destruction etc. The precise acts to meet the ends can vary to a great extent. 
 
As the Chamber did not reference or take an example from case law or instruments of 
international law (it is possible that there was no epitome to take example from), the Chamber 
created a sui generis definition for rape in international law. The Chamber came up with a 
rather broad definition of rape: ”a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person 
under circumstances which are coercive.”156 Sexual violence in this sense, which includes 
rape, is any act of sexual nature, not just coercive vaginal intercourse, but this can mean also 
any type of sexual penetration, also oral and anal, and the insertion of a finger or tongue into 
the vagina. And not just perpetrator using his own body parts, but also using objects for 
penetration or forcing the victims to engage in a physical invasion of a sexual nature. Physical 
invasion of a sexual nature does not necessitate that it has to be the perpetrator who personally 
executes the physical invasion by e.g. his own penis or by using objects. That means that 
when the victim is forced to e.g. perform fellatio on another person (who can also be a 
victim), this would be rape under this definition.  
 
The Chamber also dealt with sexual violence, which is a broader category since sexual 
violence is not limited to a physical invasion of the human body. Thus, it may include acts 
without penetration or physical contact (e.g. forced nudity).157 The Chamber brought an 
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example by asserting the act described by one witness, when the Interahamwes forced a piece 
of wood into the sexual organs of a woman, constituted rape in the Tribunal’s view.158 The 
distinction between rape and other forms of sexual violence is that rape is a physical invasion 
of a sexual nature compared to any act of a sexual nature, which is committed under 
circumstances that are coercive to the victim.159 The Tribunal was keen to explain why the 
mechanical description of objects and body parts cannot be used. The Tribunal elaborated the 
issue by stating that witnesses were unable or reluctant to disclose graphic anatomical details 
of sexual violence they endured and in such intimate matters cultural sensitivity should be 
involved.160 An major feature of this definition is gender neutrality, there is no reference that 
the perpetrator must be a man and the victim a woman. Particularly when considering that in 
2011 Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was found guilty of genocidal rape. Also, this allows 
prosecution for an act where men are also victims.   
 
Also, since it is difficult to prove the coercion, the Court further elaborated that the coercion 
does not have to be a physical force, but may also appear as threats, extortion, intimidation 
and other forms of duress.161 The Court also acknowledged that coercion may be inherent in 
certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence. This means that when 
the conditions are of overwhelming force present in certain contexts162 that are to be used as a 
campaign against the victims, scrutiny over individual consent is unreasonable.163 This wide 
interpretation takes into account the people, but specifically women already in a vulnerable 
situation.164 The Trial Chamber did not address the lack of consent as an element, but also 
mens rea was never an issue. Not even in the Appeals Chamber.165 That consent was left out 
from the elements of the rape crime is both rational and practical, particularly when 
considering rape as an international crime. In domestic jurisdictions it is comprehensible that 
consent is the focal element to distinguish between legal sexual contact and punishable sexual 
violence.166 Yet, rape and sexual violence that falls under the jurisdiction of the ad hoc 
tribunals is committed in circumstances which amount to international crimes (e.g. genocide), 
the inequality of power positions and the coercive environment is inherent in such 
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circumstances.  
 
If we consider different possible acts discussed during the previous chapter, this definition is 
broad enough to cover all the possibilities listed – vaginal, anal or oral rape by a penis or 
other body part(s) or objects. Though this does not mention anything about the perpetrator or 
his physical involvement in the physical invasion, this definition could cover also the acts of 
male rape that were discussed in the previous chapter where e.g. two brothers were forced to 
perform a fellatio to each other.  
 
In the same year, ICTY came up with their own definition of rape in Furundzija case 
(discussed in next chapter). This definition was different from what the Trial Chamber in 
Akayesu came up with. In 2000 in the Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR discussed the definition 
of rape provided by ICTR and ICTY. The ICTR did explain that the essence of rape is not in 
the description of body parts or objects involved, rather in the aggression of a sexual nature 
under coercive circumstances.167 The Trial Chamber preferred the conceptual definition of 
rape over mechanical definition since on their view the conceptual definition accommodates 
better evolving norms of criminal justice. Thus, as the Chamber referenced to Furundzija 
definition, they decided to adopt the definition of rape and sexual violence set forth in the 
Akayesu judgement.168 The trend continued in 2003 when in Niyitegeka the Court used the 
definition set forth in Akayesu.169 By that time, ICTY had already set forth their second 
(controversial) definition in the Kunarac case, which had the non-consent as an element of 
rape (discussed in the next chapter). And as these definitions were not endorsed in ICTR 
before, in 2003 came along a quite controversial judgement in ICTR. 
 
In the Semanza case, the Trial Chamber referenced to Akayesu’s definition as broad and 
Kunarac’s definition170 as narrower. The Chamber noted that the mechanical style of defining 
was previously rejected by the Tribunal, but still managed to somehow find the comparative 
analysis in Kunarac to be persuasive. Thus, the Chamber adopted the definition of rape 
created by the ICTY in the Kunarac’s decision and further explained that the mens rea of rape 
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is that the intention to effect the prohibited sexual penetration with the knowledge that it 
occurs without the consent of the victim.171 The Chamber did give this slight alleviation to 
proving consent by purporting that consent for the sexual act must be given voluntarily and 
freely and is assessed within the context of the surrounding circumstances.172 Though almost 
like offered an alleviation with this last part of the previous sentence that surrounding 
circumstances may also be taken into account, this still does not do justice since many acts 
that fall under the Akayesu definition of rape, become burdensome or even impossible to 
prove under the Semanza definition. 173  It is rather hard to understand for what this 
controversial definition was used since the factual circumstances of rapes happening during 
this case did not give any indication of that these victims who were sexually violated before 
they were killed, might have consented to neither of the aforementioned acts. Somehow the 
court neglected these victims. The Court also neglected the larger context in which these 
crimes take place. The Court thought it is more noteworthy to focus on mechanical body parts 
and interactions between body parts. The Court also rethought the rape crime to as it is 
something happening on the individual level, they neglected the nexus with the war situation. 
The non-consent element makes this case to look even irrational since no other crime against 
humanity, when other standards have been met, has required the act to be proven 
nonconsensual. The Court made something that was used to commit a crime against humanity 
to be like sex – you either consent or you do not, depending on your wishes.174 Thus, the 
Chamber disregarded the fact that these rapes occur as mass atrocities, outlining these as more 
of individual sexual interactions giving the possibility of even considering such acts as 
potentially consensual. As a consolation prize the Court stated that now when the definition is 
changed, and if other acts of sexual violence that do not satisfy the narrow definition, the 
Court may still prosecute these sexual acts as other crimes against humanity such as torture, 
persecution, enslavement, or other inhumane acts.175  
 
In 2003 another case was settled in ICTR – Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli. The Trial Chamber once 
again reviewed the jurisprudence of rape. The Chamber referenced to Akayesu and its 
conceptual definition but decided not to use it. Then the Chamber made reference to both 
Furundzija and Kunarac definitions and somehow decided that regarding the evolution of the 
law in this matter and the endorsement of the mechanical definition with the non-consent as 
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an element, this approach was more persuasive and therefore the Chamber adopted Kunarac’s 
definition of rape. This means that the actus reus of rape is constituted by: ”the sexual  
penetration, however slight: (i) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or  (ii) of the mouth of the victim by 
the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the 
victim.” Mens rea of rape as a crime against humanity was stated to be with the intention to 
effect the sexual penetration, with the knowledge that it was being done without the victim’s 
consent.176 The Chamber followed the footsteps of Semanza Trial Chamber by stating that 
when other acts of sexual violence fall outside of this definition, the Court may prosecute 
such acts as other inhumane acts.177 Nothing in the circumstances or the facts of this case 
indicated to such need as to replace the working Akayesu definition with this narrow 
definition. This, however, decontextualizes rape as a tactic by ignoring the concept of these 
crimes and making these more of like individual sexual interaction matters when including 
the consent as an element. Consent definition emphasizes on the individual space instead of 
the surrounding context. This may have detrimental effect on the way we view rape as a 
tactic.  
 
The Chamber was convinced that rapes and sexual assaults were committed by Interahamwe, 
but the majority could not conclude that the Accused was physically present during the 
commission of the rapes and sexual assaults or that beyond reasonable doubt the Accused 
specifically instructed the commission of rape. The accused ordered to kill, but according to 
the Majority, the commission of rape was a collateral crime.178 Judge Arlette Ramaroson did 
not agree with the Majority’s rationale for dismissing the charge of rape, thus she wrote in a 
dissenting opinion that a separate sentence for Kajelijeli’s criminal responsibility for rape 
should still be envisaged. She further explained that the evidence supported the allegations 
and the decision of dismissal lacked both in fact and in law.179 She felt that the ratio decidendi 
for the majority decision was full of inconsistencies and explained on false grounds.180 The 
majority analyzed the killings at the same time as rape, since many of these happened 
basically the same time. The same witnesses testified on both acts, rapes and killings. But 
somehow the majority did not find the testimonial evidence of rape enough. Moreso, the 
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Court challenged the credibility of these testimonies and were somehow not able to conclude 
superior accountability for rapes, but with the same testimonies, the Chamber was able to 
conclude for the killings. Judge Ramaroson agreed that the evidence does not sufficiently 
prove that Kajelijeli planned the rapes, there was sufficient evidence to determine that 
Kajelijeli did instigate, order, aid and abet the commission of rape(s). Thus, instead of 
superior responsibility the Judge saw more fit to apply Kajelijeli’s responsibility as an 
accomplice to the rapes committed by Interahamwe since the Accused gave orders to rape, 
instigated the commission of rape and aided and abetted the perpetration by providing 
material aid and moral support to his Interahmawe.181 The dissent was well reasoned and 
therefore it would have been intriguing to see the Appeals Chamber’s stand on the matter. 
However, the Prosecutor missed the deadline to appeal rape charges. 
 
In 2004, in Kamuhanda the Chamber followed the exact same path as the previous two cases, 
by endorsing the Kunarac’s definition and consoling the impact with the possibility of the 
other inhumane acts label instead of rape when necessary. It was evident that somehow the 
mechanical definition is seen as a more detailed definition.182 And the Chamber tends to draw 
equal signs between detailed and legally more accurate. This is a bit flawed presumption since 
detailed as with stronger accuracy and detailed as if having more details (by quantity) does 
not equal the same meaning. However, the Trial Chamber in Kamuhanda decided to slide 
with the same fallacy by not analysing the concept of these crimes and on which part the 
previous jurisprudence adequately addresses the issue, but rather just compared two 
definitions on paper, separating the law from the facts, and choosing the one more detailed 
but not more accurately addressing the concept of rape.183  
 
In 2005 ICTR went back to the old route with Muhimana, where the the Akayesu definition of 
rape was endorsed.184 The Chamber accurately analyzed prior relevant judgements. As was 
elaborated that though rape has been historically defined in many national jurisdictions as 
”non-consensual sexual intercourse,” the Trial Chamber in Akayesu used factual findings 
from their case (thrusting a piece of wood into sexual organs) to state that this definition is an 
inadequate response to rape prosecuted under their jurisdiction.185 As rape is not always 
committed in the form of an intercourse, but can be also committed with objects, this path 
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would have been too narrow. The Chamber also noted that Akayesu definition has not been 
adopted per se in all subsequent jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals by referencing to 
Semanza, Kajelijeli, and Kamuhanda, which all ignored the conceptual definition and used 
mechanical instead. Still, the Chamber was of opinion that the circumstances in most cases 
charged under the international criminal law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes, will be almost universally coercive, thus vitiating true consent.186 This is a victory 
in a sense since this approach clearly reckons the nature, motives and context in which these 
crimes occur.  
 
Though in Gacumbitsi case the Chamber did not deal with creating a new definition, the 
Appeals Chamber in 2006 dealt with the main contradiction of previous jurisprudence on the 
matter – the consent element. The crime of rape, when it is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
occurs in the context of such circumstances in which the genuine consent is impossible. 
Therefore, the Prosecution does not have to bear the burden of proving non-consent and 
knowledge.187 The Chamber also elaborated on the practical matter of how may non-consent 
be proven. The non-consent can beyond a reasonable doubt be proven by proving the 
existence of coercive circumstances under which the meaningful consent is impossible. That 
does not mean evidence of force per se, but also the background circumstances that can 
negate the genuine consent, such as ongoing genocide campaign or the detention of 
victims.188 Though, the Appeals Chamber sought to provide practical guidelines to address 
prosecutorial difficulties on proving coercion, force or consent, the Chamber also accepted the 
lack of consent and knowledge as elements of the crime of rape. This was an unfortunate 
culmination of the legacy of the ICTR. Albeit, the Akayesu definition continues to be used in 
practice.   
 
4.2.	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Yugoslavia	
 
The ICTY elaborated the same issue also in 1998, in the case of the Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 
where Anto Furundzija was found guilty of torture and outrages upon personal dignity 
including rape, as violations of the laws or customs of war. 189  The Trial Chamber 
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acknowledged rape as the most serious manifestation of sexual assault. Regarding the 
definition of the crime of rape, ICTY took a different view than ICTR. While ICTY did 
reference to Akayesu decision and their non-mechanical definition, ICTY stated that the 
Chamber must seek the definition of the basis of ”nullum crimen sine lege stricta,” thus was 
decided to create a new definition. And for arriving at an accurate definition of rape, it was 
seen necessary to look at the principles of the major legal systems, also national laws.190 The 
Trial Chamber analyzed the laws of several jurisdictions and stipulated that according to the 
Penal Codes of some states191 the actus reus of rape consists of penetration (however slight) 
of the female sexual organ by the male sexual organ. According to other states,192 rape can be 
committed against a victim of either sex. The Trial Chamber concluded that from the survey 
of national legislation, though there were discrepancies, rape is in most legal systems 
considered as a forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or forcible 
insertion of any other object into the vagina or anus.193 Then the Chamber came up with their 
own definition.  
 
The Trial Chamber stated that the following  elements may be accepted as objective elements 
of rape: 
- ”the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(i) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; or any other object used 
by the perpetrator; or  
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;  
- by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”194  
 
ICTY did take a step further with the definition while adding to objective elements the 
possibility of the threat of force against a third person. While explicitly adding this element, it 
provides more clarity and certainty. The Court made a reference to an article in the Penal 
Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which criminalized coercing a female into sexual 
intercourse by force or threat to endanger the life or body of the victim or someone close to 
her. This takes into consideration situations where physical violence is not used, but instead, 
e.g. the perpetrator threatens to kill the child of the victim. Situations like these would then 
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fulfill the coercion element.195  
 
However, the problem with this definition is that it is gender-biased. According to this 
definition, one may be prosecuted only if he is male. Female can be prosecuted only if she 
used an object, but not in case of forced oral sex, because forced oral sex is punishable only 
when the perpetrator has a penis. Then, certain sexual conducts which would have constituted 
rape according to Akayesu definition, are not included e.g. penetrating vagina using a finger. 
Because according to the definition, it is rape only when vagina or anus is penetrated by the 
penis (of the perpetrator) or an object. Other body parts are not included though. The problem 
here is if we consider the forced fellatio cases, the situation where one male detainee is forced 
to perform oral sex on another male detainee. Forcing one person to rape another is a problem 
under this definition, unlike the ICC in this case, where the definition “conduct resulting in 
penetration” which allows a broad interpretation while not stating that the perpetrator him-
/herself must invade the body. The ICC definition here would allow to fall those rapes also 
under the rape definition where a third person is used to commit rape. This is essential since 
there have been many cases in practice where the perpetrators force another person to commit 
the rape. With this definition, the practice is what will determine.  
 
In Prosecutor v. Brđanin there is a reference to fellatio, but no charges on the matter.196 In 
Todorovic six men were forced to perform fellatio on each other on three different 
occasions,197 and as this did not fulfill rape requirements under the working definition, it was 
prosecuted as sexual assault.198 In Mucic the forced fellatio was also not treated as rape, but 
inhumane treatment and cruel treatment.199 Though it was noted that forced fellatio could 
constitute rape, the Chamber still decided to find that this was an attack against human 
dignity.200 In Češić plea agreement, the Chamber explained that these situations ought to be 
covered also where the accused caused the victim(s) to be sexually penetrated without their 
consent, thus it does not have to be the penis of the perpetrator but forced fellatio cases should 
also constitute rape.201 Yet this attitude was not evident in subsequent cases.  
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Though it is more than welcome that the Trial Chamber wished to arrive at accuracy in 
definition, the Chamber failed to realize a fundamentally flawed premise that was present. 
While the Chamber sought for common denominators, as was stated, from national rape laws, 
an example was taken from jurisdictions, which criminalize a different phenomenon – a crime 
mainly committed for sexual motives in a greatly different context. None of these examples 
had dealt with the crime of rape in a context where it is used as a tool of group coercion.202 
The domestic rape crime is not the correct paradigm from which to interpret a definition for 
rape as an international crime. If at all, it would have been more appropriate to take an 
example of those national laws that criminalize sexual acts between people in unequal power 
position e.g. prisoners and guards, teachers and students. Even just understanding the 
ideology behind using rape as a group-coercion would have had a more appropriate outcome 
on the definition. Tactical rape is rarely a singular, isolated act that influences only the victim. 
The main idea of using rape as a tool is the broader ideological dynamic, and social and 
community consequences. As it is meant to harm the group or a community, by intimidating 
other people in the group, by fragmenting or destroying the community ties (with fear, shame, 
stigmatization and ostracism), enforcing subordination of the group members by making them 
know who has the power and control. It is for social control, coercion and intimidation to 
terrorize compliance of the group, not the specific individual. As was explained in Chapter II, 
the context of tactical rape in practice is already taking place in a coercive environment which 
negates the possibility to consent, though this is not a particular problem of this definition. 
Taking an example of national rape laws ignores the specifics of rape as a tactic. And as 
national rape laws are created, each will, in its own way, also reflect the broader historical and 
cultural implication, societal standpoints, and the problems in practice. But as we are talking 
about a very different phenomenon, many national laws often include actus reus similar to 
this definition, a mechanical description. And this might be reasonable in national law if an 
act is committed mainly for sexual purposes, the mechanical definition works to distinguish 
consensual sexual activity from an illegal sexual activity. But with group-coercion, the 
perpetrators will choose means that will fit the purpose. The specific acts can vary greatly as 
was seen in Chapter II. Forcing other people to commit rape (e.g. forced fellatio cases in 
ICTY) is a way to humiliate the victims, other members of the group and destroying or at 
least weakening the community ties. By taking into account the group-coercion, the definition 
would not include gender-bias since, in order to coerce a group, the perpetrator need not be a 
male, need not be committing rape by his penis and the victim would not also be assumed to 
be a female. If the purpose is to e.g. humiliate or destroy, then male rape is an effective tool.  
                                                
202 MacKinnon, supra note 97, para. 946. 
 49 
Furundzija Trial Chamber elaborated on the forced oral penetration issue by explaining that 
according to the survey data, some States treated forced oral penetration as sexual assault and 
some states categorized it as rape. Since there was no uniformity on the matter, the Chamber 
held that forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ is one of the most 
humiliating and degrading attacks upon human dignity. The protection of dignity as a value 
here is treated with the uttermost significance. And since forcible oral sex can be just as 
humiliating and traumatic experience for the victim as anal or vaginal penetration, and taking 
into account the fundamental principle of protecting human dignity, this principle helped to 
favour widening the definition of rape so as it covers forced oral sex.203 But in practice, there 
still seems to be a gender-bias, since forced fellatio when the victim is female is seen more as 
a crime of rape and as a sexual crime, but in male rape, it is more about dignity and inhumane 
nature of the acts. 
 
However, the second objective element means that an act has to be committed under 
circumstances which are coercive or by using force, hence force or coercion were now 
accepted as elements of the rape crime. The element of using force was taken from the notion 
that all jurisdictions204 surveyed by the Trial Chamber required an element of force, coercion, 
threat, or acting without the consent of the victim. The force was given a broad interpretation, 
thus it included the situation where the victim is helpless or unable to give consent (e.g. due to 
age or mental incapacity).205  
 
The Chamber clarified that international criminal rules punish both rape and any serious 
sexual assault falling short of actual penetration. This prohibition ought to include all serious 
abuses of a sexual nature upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by a coercion, 
threat of force or intimidation in such way that is humiliating and degrading for the victim’s 
dignity. And as pointed out by the Chamber, both rape and sexual assault are criminalised acts 
under international law, and the distinction here is material for the sentencing purposes, not an 
issue of investigating or prosecuting.206   
 
In 2001, ICTY continued with the same issue, the crime of rape, in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, Kovac & Vokovic. This was the first conviction by the ICTY considering rape as a 
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crime against humanity. It is important to note that contrary to war crimes in cases of crimes 
against humanity the nexus to armed conflict is not required. The trial against those three 
accused has been also called the ”rape camp case since the sexual violence against the victims 
was a systematic campaign and the victims were held in the detention center (and in other 
places also) in captivity, and they were raped on regular basis.”207  The Trial Chamber once 
again analyzed the definition of the crime of rape. It reviewed Tribunal’s jurisprudence and 
domestic laws of multiple jurisdictions and concluded another dimension of the definition. 
The Chamber agreed that the elements which were set out in the Furundzija case, constitute 
actus reus of the crime of rape in international criminal law. Still, as explained, the facts in 
Furundzija were narrower and the definition did not reflect the appropriate scope of the crime 
under international law.208 The new dimension, however, was about clarifying the second 
element of actus reus, i.e. the threat, force or coercion.  The Trial Chamber elaborated that 
that second element is more narrowly stated that is required by international law. ”The 
Furundžija definition does not refer to other factors which would render an act of sexual 
penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.”209  The Chamber tried 
to look at the common denominators and came to the conclusion that rape is a sexual 
penetration that happens without the consent of the victim and therefore stipulated that it is 
not only force, the threat of force, and coercion but also the absence of consent or voluntary 
participation of the victim.210  
 
Further, the Trial Chamber explained that on basis of the relevant law of different 
jurisdictions suveyed during the Furundzija case which classify relevant sexual acts as the 
crime of rape can be divided into three broad categories:  
”(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the victim or a third party;  
(ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified circumstances 
which made the victim particularly vulnerable or negated her ability to make an informed 
refusal; or (iii) the sexual activity occurs without the consent of the victim.”211  
 
The Court continued by stating that it is not just force or threat of force, but there can be 
certain other specified circumstances. These include the situations where the victim is in a 
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state of being unable to resist, was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resisting because of 
mental or physical incapability, or when the victim was influenced by surprise or 
misrepresentation.212 By exemplifying current notion the Court references to national laws of 
many countries’, including Estonian Criminal Code according to which rape was defined as 
sexual intercourse “by violence or threat of violence or by taking advantage of the helpless 
situation of the victim.”213 These examples included references to mental illnesses, being 
drugged or unconscious, age (being a minor), psychological pressure, physical illness etc. The 
emphasis was put on the meaning of such provision which claims that in some cases the 
absence of force or threat of force there may be certain other reasons which cause the victim 
to be in a state of incapacity of giving an informed or reasoned refusal to the act.214 Thus, the 
absence of victim’s free and genuine consent to sexual penetration can constitute rape.  
 
The Court stated that in international law the actus reus of the crime of rape is constituted by: 
”the sexual penetration, however slight: (i) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of 
the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (ii) the mouth of the victim by 
the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the 
victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s 
free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the 
intention to effect this sexual penetration and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent 
of the victim.”215  
 
The first two sections (a and b) are literal excerpts from the Furundzija case. But in this case, 
regarding the consent element, the Chamber adopted a new approach, which used ”lack of 
consent” instead of ”coercion or force or threat of force.” This alteration to the definition 
gives solid protection to the victims and ends the perpetrators’ defence for evading liability 
while arguing e.g. that physical force was not used. Although force provides clear evidence of 
lack of consent, the non-consent does not always equal to force. Since certain circumstances 
in which the crime of rape is taking place, in some cases negate the possibility of meaningful 
consent. So the underlying rationale here is that the narrow focus on force would permit 
perpetrators to evade liability. The Trial Chamber established that the definition has to take 
into account the situation of taking advantage of coercive circumstances of vulnerable people, 
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where there is no need to rely on physical force.216 And lastly, as seen by the aforestated 
conclusions of the Trial Chamber, there are two mens rea requirements – the intent covering 
the sexual act itself and also proof of the knowledge that the sexual act occurred without the 
consent of the victim. Though no supporting argument for that was given by the Trial 
Chamber, it is clear that the reasonable mistake of fact defence to negate the required mens 
rea of the crime would be possible for the accused ones. The appeals panel rejected the 
appellants’ arguments that the definition is inaccurate and explained that a narrow focus on 
force or threat of force would be inappropriate and allow for perpetrators to evade liability.217  
 
The mens rea requirement could be problematic for both, the victims for acknowledgement 
and the prosecution to prove. The issue with the mens rea requirement was immediately put to 
test also. The accused, Dragoljub Kunarac, argued that he thought he had consensual sexual 
relations with the victim who genuinely consented to this act. In this case, the victim was not 
threatened by the accused, but by another soldier who threatened to kill the victims if she did 
not satisfy the desires of his commander, Dragoljub Kunarac. The accused argued that he had 
no knowledge of this.218 Though, this was a close one since under this definition it might even 
have worked. The Trial Chamber rejected the statements by the accused and determined that 
the accused possessed knowledge of the surrounding circumstances (the general context of 
war, other women were being raped there, that victim was in captivity and feared for her life) 
that illustrated the lack of consent on victim’s part. The Chamber accepted that the accused 
was aware that the victim was raped by other soldiers before him and was in the full 
knowledge that the victim did not freely consent to sexual intercourse with him.219 The 
second part of the mens rea gives the perpetrators some room to evade justice (see also 
Chapter 4.4. about the same issue in Sesay). 
 
The Trial Chamber analyzed the basic principle underlying the crime of rape in national 
jurisdictions and determined that it was the serious violation of sexual autonomy which is still 
surrounded with the consent issue since the violation happens when the person subject to the 
act has not freely agreed to it or is not a voluntary participant otherwise.220 Thus, the ICTY 
Trial Chamber once again inspected the jurisprudence and domestic laws of multiple 
jurisdictions while making the flawed premise even stronger to navigate to course in the 
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nonconsent direction. As stated, none of these examples had dealt with the crime of rape in a 
context where it is used as a tool of group coercion.221 This played little role in the outcome. 
And the proof of force shifted into the proof of consent. This is retrogression instead of 
development.   
 
On appeal, the appellant challenged the definition of rape by stating that in order to 
demonstrate non-consent there has to be continuous and genuine resistance by the victim(s) 
throughout the duration of the sexual intercourse, otherwise it can be interpreted as the victim 
consented to the sexual intercourse.222 The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber’s 
definition of rape, however, made note of two points. Firstly the Chamber rejected the 
Appellants “resistance” requirement since it was not supported by customary law and for the 
argument that without continuous resistance it is not possible for the perpetrator to understand 
that his attention is unwanted is wrong on the law and absurd on the facts.223 The author 
agrees as for one reason why it does not make sense is that when there is no resistance present 
this does not indicate that the person freely and genuinely consented to the act. Also, 
resistance might prompt a more violent response and to demand proof of resistance would put 
an unjust burden on victim’s shoulder.224 
 
Secondly, the actus reus changed to a great amount with this case. The appeals panel 
explained that this case does not reject the definition created during the Furundzija case, but 
rather wanted and tried to explain the relationship between force and consent. However, it is 
not possible to agree with the notion since there is a significant change in the elements of the 
rape between two cases. Force and consent are distinct elements since the former is about the 
actions of the perpetrator, while with the latter it is describing the state of the victim.225 
Though with caution, Appeals Chamber did not depart from the definition, it did try to soften 
the non-consent part by giving reason into why in certain coercive circumstances true consent 
will not be possible. The Chamber stated that in cases of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity the circumstances will be almost universally coercive and negate the possibility of 
true consent.226  And since these rapes happened in detention centers, their line of reasoning 
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regarding the consent issue again was supported by relying on the state and national laws. 
However, this time, the author must state, that they did not go wrong with that. Though the 
Appeals Chamber themselves stipulate, that they support their line of reasoning with laws that 
are designed for circumstances far removed from war context, it is reasonable and logical to 
state sexual offences committed against people under detention negates their possibility to 
truly consent. The law reasonably recognized the unequal positions of power and the 
coerciveness that is inherent in the situation. It is not clear why the Court did not depart from 
the non-consent element in the decision since they did argue against it but still left it there to 
exist. They did highlight the need to presume non-consent in cases like these, with similar 
circumstances.227  
 
It is as win regarding this case, but still a zero-sum game from the part that the Appeals 
Chamber did not use their power to end the non-consent issue which clearly is a shift to 
retrogression, particularly considering the already vulnerable position rape victims are in. 
While considering the data from the II Chapter of this thesis, the line of reasoning Appeals 
Chamber used to support the reality of protection the victims need. Here, the author is 
specifically emphasizing on the context in which these crimes occur. And making non-
consent something that has to be proven in such crimes, it clearly disregards the essence of 
rape as a tactic.   
 
Though these landmark cases set eminent milestones in the history of international law by 
creating the first-ever definitions of rape crime in international law, the incompatible and 
inaccurate definitions bring about the inconsistent prosecutions and convictions.228 The lack 
of clear definition of rape has resulted in certain acts being treated as secondary crimes.229 
There is still a need for cogency, but also for the Tribunals to take into account the specific 
nature of these crimes for that to be achieved.  
 
4.3.	International	Criminal	Court	
 
The role of ICC is crucial since it is a permanent court with the authority to investigate and 
prosecute the most serious of crimes that concern the international community. While ICTR 
only dealt with Rwanda, and ICTY only with Former Yugoslavia, the ICC has dealt with the 
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most serious international crimes in Darfur, Kenya, DRC, Mali, Uganda, Libya etc. The 
permanent nature of the court makes its normative and symbolical contribution to the 
international law (and community) to be substantial. And with the support of 123 nations, the 
ICC could be the most effective body for prosecuting the crime of rape.230 Article 7(g) of the 
ICC Stature prohibits rape and, also sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. This means 
that the case must meet the gravity threshold for admissibility.231 ICC, unlike the Tribunals, 
did not form the working definition of rape through a case, but before they even prosecuted 
the first rape case.   
 
The ICC established the definition  of rape in international law while looking at the work of 
the two tribunals. The definition of rape itself is the same under the crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. According to the ’Elements of Crimes’ the actus reus of rape crime is the 
following: 
- ”The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body.  
- The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent.”232  
 
This definition seems to be a compromise between the preceding definitions from ICTR and 
ICTY practice, a middle ground from both sides. The sexual act of rape can be in various 
forms of sexual activity if it is proved to be forced. The first section mentions ’any part of the 
body’ which means that e.g. hands or fingers can be considered as means for the forced sexual 
act. This definition includes both side, the perpetrator and the victim, thus the penetration can 
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be done by the perpetrator to the victim as well as by the victim to the perpetrator. This means 
that for an act to constitute rape, there is either penetration of sexual organs or with sexual 
organs. Yet, it is not clear whether forced masturbation is covered. Or forced sexual 
intercourse with animals.233    
 
ICC’s definition is not gender-biased like in Furundzija case. This means that ICC has taken 
into account that there is no difference on the gender of the victim or the perpetrator. Thus, 
for fairness, men are also considered as possible victims and as was presented in Chapter II of 
this thesis, male rape is a real concern and does also need an adequate answer. The Court 
takes into account that women can also be perpetrators.  
 
In the second paragraph, ICC describes the conditions under which the behavior explained in 
paragraph 1 constitutes rape. And as seen, the ICC has given a broad scope for these terms 
and physical resistance is not required. As the term ’such as’ indicates, there are certain 
enumerated grounds given as an example, but other grounds may also be applicable. Besides, 
ICC has also added the momentous notion, which especially during wartime situations and 
due to the coercive environment, is extremely relevant - the threat against a third person. The 
last part of the second paragraph seems to be an interesting addition, which is to some extent 
more similar to how States in their national legal system approach to what constitutes rape. 
This was also discussed during Kunarac case, when the Trial Chamber explained that just 
force or threat of force approach is too narrow, whereas there can be certain other specified 
circumstances (e.g. age, mental illness etc.).234  However, the wording of the Kunarac 
definition was not as satisfying as the one over here. Protecting people incapable of giving 
genuine consent according to ICC refers to people who are affected by natural, induced or 
age-related incapacity.235 This gives necessary protection to certain vulnerable groups, e.g. 
children, physically disabled people etc. In the Prosecutor v. Bemba the Court stipulated that  
if rape is committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent then Prosecution 
have to prove only the victim’s incapacity to genuinely consent by natural, induced or age-
related circumstances.236 Articles defining the crime of rape only include actus reus of the 
crime. Mens rea is not explicitly stated, therefore Art 30 of the Rome Statute applies. The 
article in question claims that [f]or the criminal responsibility and liability, all material 
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elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 237  Thus, to fulfill the mens rea 
requirement, it must be proven that the perpetrator’s intent covers the act of invading the body 
of another person by penetration and secondly, that perpetrator knows that it was committed 
by using force or coercion elaborated in the second article of the elements stated in previous 
sections. Whereas the ICC did not use the ”lack of consent” as an element, instead, they have 
two mens rea requirements and also allow for a mistake of fact defence.  
 
Though the consent matter was quite clearly established by the Elements of the Crimes, the  
Rules and Procedures Art. 70 adds two important notions to proving sexual violence. The 
consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the 
alleged sexual violence;238 which is a wise thing to assert since the lack of resistance was 
already argued in Kunarac and ICC thoughtfully chose to prevent possible future defences 
based on the lack of resistance notion. The second addition was pointing out that the 
credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability (of the victim or witness), cannot 
be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of prior or subsequent conduct.239 Art. 71 explains 
that the Court will not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of the victim 
or witness.240    
 
ICC was the first one to reference to age-related capacity, i.e. what we know as the age of 
consent in national jurisdictions. Though the age of consent varies in different jurisdictions, 
e.g. in Europe, it varies between 14 to 18, in Africa, it ranges from age 12 to 18 (e.g. 18 in 
Rwanda, DRC and Kenya). The ICC included in its rape definition the notion ”incapable of 
giving genuine consent.” The footnote of the paragraph explains that the incapability can be 
affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity.241 The specific age is not provided by 
the ICC, presumably they will take an example from different national jurisdictions to 
determine the age of consent when necessary. And in this case, taking an example from 
national jurisdictions would be reasonable since many national jurisdictions have solved the 
issue by setting a specific age under which a person is incapable of genuinely consenting. 
Though social sentiments and cultural relativity can be strong determinants of the differences, 
the practice can indicate some relevant patterns for either the minimum age or substantiating 
the age-related incapacity.   
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In 2012 the first ever conviction was made in ICC. It was the case of Lubanga. Regardless 
that there was evidence about the widespread rape, particularly against girl child soldiers, the 
sexual violence crimes were not included in the charges.242 We had to wait four more years 
for this definition to be used by the court.   
 
It was in 2016 when ICC convicted a person for a crime of rape.  In a landmark judgement, in 
the case Prosecutor v. Bemba, the definition of rape created by the ICC got its plea to the 
fullest. Notably, when we compare it with ICTY and ICTR definitions of the crime of rape. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Bemba) was convicted for his responsibility as a commander-in-
chief for crimes of murder, pillage and rape which were committed by soldiers under his 
effective control and authority. Bemba was charged with two counts of sexual violence: rape 
as a crime against humanity and rape as a war crime. Intriguing, in this case, is that the 
victims included both men and women; inter alia rape of children even as young as 10-years 
old. For the ICC’s definition being gender neutral and for it containing the special protection 
for certain vulnerable groups, at least in this case, there was a legal foundation for the 
protection of all victims.243   
 
While being familiar with the inadequate track ICTY took, ICC’s definition does not feel that 
dissatisfactory. However, there was this kind of anticipation that ICC will resolve the 
definitional debate. The Trial Chamber explained that non-consent was intentionally left out 
of the definition by the drafters as this requirement would undermine the efforts to bring 
perpetrators to justice.244 The Court does angle toward force and coercion by stating that if the 
Prosecution is able to prove force, threat of force or coercion or taking advantage of the 
coercive environment, then there is no need to prove the victim’s lack of consent. This 
however still left open the possibility of the consent issue.245 The statement suggests that 
when the Prosecution is unable to prove force, threat of force or coercion or coercive 
environment it is possible to rely on the victim’s lack of consent. This will possibly be 
determined by the future cases.  
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4.4.	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone	
 
The SCSL differ from previous discussed international courts since SCSL is a hybrid tribunal. 
This means that it combines both, the international and domestic forces for prosecution. It was 
created by an agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, but this can also have an impact 
on prosecuting sexual violence. That is because SCSL has a limited mandate, it applies both 
national and international law, it is located in Sierra Leone and is funded purely by 
donations.246  
 
Still, the SCSL had an obvious upper hand in defining the rape due to the considerable body 
of precedent that its predecessors have created. SCSL dealt with the definition of the crime of 
rape in 2007. It was the case of Prosecutor v. Brima et al. Rape was used as a means to 
commit a crime against humanity. The Trial Chamber reviewed the work of both tribunals 
and ICC.  
 
The Court made reference to Akayesu, Delalic, Furundzija, Musema, Kunarac and Semanza, 
and adopted the following definition of rape: 
 
- “The non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator or by any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the 
mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; and  
- The intent to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without 
the consent of the victim.”247 
 
The definition has similarities with the ICTY’s Kunarac definition since it also has an 
emphasis on the lack of consent instead of the threat or force. The Trial Chamber elaborated 
by referencing to the Kunarac’s Appeal Judgement that consent must be given voluntarily, as 
a result of the victim’s free will and that force or threat is not an element per se of rape, 
because other relevant factors and circumstances can influence victim’s ability to consent 
regardless of force or threat.  
 
                                                
246 Bringing Justice: the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Accomplishments, shortcomings, and needed 
support. Human Rights Watch 2004. Accessible: https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/09/08/bringing-
justice-special-court-sierra-leone/accomplishments-shortcomings-and  (01.03.2018). 
247 Brima, supra note 55, para. 693. 
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It was the first case where the age of consent was stated. According to the Trial Chamber, 
children below the age of 14 cannot give valid consent. This is extremely material since it has 
not been discussed in previous cases, regardless that during other hearings there were victims 
even younger than the age of ten.248 Setting a precise age is momentous for cases where 
children are used for sex but violence or threats were not present. In these cases, it is possible 
that violence or threat of violence is not necessary due to the child’s age-related incapacity to 
consent.    
 
The Court also explained that the offence of other inhumane acts is a residual clause249 which 
covers a broad range of underlying acts that are not explicitly enumerated in the Statute. Since 
there is an exhaustive category of sexual crimes particularised in the Statute,250 the offence of 
other inhumane acts, regardless that it is residual, must logically be restrictively interpreted as 
applying only to acts of a non-sexual nature amounting to an affront to human dignity. 
Though it is understandable, that there should be no specific list of acts falling under the other 
inhumane acts since it would possibly create an undesirable situation where acts not falling 
under the exhaustive list would have otherwise fulfilled the criteria.  
 
However, in 2009, in the case Prosecutor v. Sesay et al. the Trial Chamber adopted a new 
version of a definition.  
 
- “The Accused invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the Accused with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body;  
- The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power against such person or another person or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent;  
- The Accused intended to effect the sexual penetration or acted in the reasonable 
knowledge that this was likely to occur; and  
                                                
248 Ibid, para. 694. 
249  UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16.01.2002, Art. 2(i). 
Accessible: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda29f94.html (01.03.2018). 
250 Ibid, Art. 2(g). 
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- The Accused knew or had reason to know that the victim did not consent.”251  
 
This definition is clearly combined from the Kunarac’s definition and the ICC’s definition. 
The Trial Chamber explained that the first element of the actus reus defines the type of 
physical invasion of the body that constitutes rape. They made reference to Furundzija case 
by stating that any part of the body includes genital, anal or oral penetration. The definition of 
invasion is broad since it covers all three possibilities – penetration by sexual organ, by any 
other part of the body (e.g. digital penetration) or by an object. The importance of this could 
not be stressed since Furundzija definition did not include penetration by any other body part 
except the penis. And the definition is gender-neutral, which is extremely material.252   
 
The Chamber continued to explain the second element of the actus reus by stating that the 
essence of the second element is to describe the circumstances under which a person is not 
capable of voluntarily and genuinely consenting to the act. The second element is an exact 
excerpt of ICC’s definition, however, the Trial Chamber interpreted the content and the 
meaning of this element by relying on the Kunarac’s Appeal Judgement. In Kunarac the 
Court included the absence of consent as the conditio sine qua non of rape. The references 
and explanations the Court used made things puzzling since they actually did not include the 
lack of consent as an element into the definition, but still argued in favor of it.253   
 
The mens rea in Sesay is not the same as in Kunarac. It is a bit broader and gives more room 
for the prosecution to prove the case. In Kunarac it was “the intention to effect this sexual 
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”254 In Sesay 
firstly the proof of the accused’s intention to the sexual penetration or reasonable knowledge 
that this would occur. The second part needs proof of either knowing or had reason to know 
the victim did not consent. This means that the proof needed does not have to indicate beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused was aware, but it can also be that one has reason to be 
aware of the lack of consent. This definition allows to use the coercive environment instead of 
the lack of consent, i.e. the perpetrator had know or had to have a reason to know about the 
coercive circumstances that negate the possibility of genuine consent. The Court used more 
                                                
251 Sesay, supra note 58, para. 145. 
252 Ibid, para. 146. 
253 Ibid, para. 147. 
254 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Appeal Judgement), IT-96-
23 & IT-96-23/1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 12 June 2002, 
para. 129. Accessible: http://www.icty.org/case/kunarac/4 (03.03.2018).  
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effective mens rea requirements than in Kunarac since the language and the elements are 
already trying to avoid the congestions the Trial Chamber in Kunarac had to deal with.  
 
4.5.	Synopsis		
 
The judicial creativity of the courts and tribunals over the rape definition has been versatile.  
In September 1998 the first definition of rape was created. The conceptual definition in 
Akayesu did not include a mechanical description of body parts, gender-bias or non-consent as 
an element. Instead, it tried to capture the true nature of rape. ICTR started off with a strong 
example by creating a broad and progressive definition.  
 
In ICTY, the Akayesu definition was endorsed and applied in Delalić case. Yet, the 
Furundzija Trial Chamber, also in 1998, decided to depart from the conceptual definition and 
to capture an accurate definition. To arrive at an accurate definition based of the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege stricta, the Trial Chamber took an example from the national 
legislation of different states and captured the objective elements of the rape crime as a 
mechanical description of body parts. The Chamber also emphasized that any form of 
captivity vitiates consent. This view was later endorsed in the Kvocka et al. Then, the main 
difference on definitional matter was on the actus reus of the crime, where ICTR had a broad 
conceptual definition emphasizing on a physical invasion of a sexual nature and ICTY had a 
more narrow definition emphasizing on expressis verbis stated combinations of possible acts 
that require penetration. However, in 2001 the ICTY moved away from the contemplation of 
the conceptual vis-á-vis mechanical to a completely new dimension. The Trial Chamber in 
Kunarac adopted a new definition which introduced the non-consent as an element of the 
definition.  
 
The Akayesu definition was also endorsed in Musema, and a comparison between the Akayesu 
and Furundzija definitions were made and the former was seen as more appropriate to adapt 
to the evolving norms of criminal justice. However, Akayesu definition was not adopted in all 
subsequent jurisprudence of the ICTR. In Semanza, Kajelijeli and Kamuhanda, the Trial 
Chambers shifted away from the conceptual definition and decided to use a mechanical 
definition instead. One reason for that can be that in Akayesu the Chamber explained that 
there is no accepted definition in international law and only referenced to CAT (while using 
an analogy from torture). No other sources of international law, no instruments or examples of 
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case-law was identified or used to support the definition. The lack of discussion supporting 
the creation of the definition opposed to the fact that in Kunarac, the references and examples 
were of abundant, it is no wonder that the Chambers in Semanza, Kajelijeli and Kamuhanda 
found the explanation of persuasive authority. One does wonder if the Chamber in Akayesu 
would have offered a substantial interpretational basis for the definition of rape, might have 
the outcome been different?  
 
Subsequent cases in ICTR tried to reconcile between the disparate definitions of rape and 
ended up combining the mechanical and conceptual approaches in some ways. In Gacumbitsi 
the consent disparity was solved by the Chamber accepting that the lack of consent is an 
element of the crime of rape. The lack of consent can be proven by establishing coercive 
circumstances. The Akayesu definition was subsequently used by the ICTR in later cases. 
However, the impact of these cases has been imperative, if not for arriving at one working 
definition, then at least building up a cogent interpretational basis of the elements of the crime 
of rape in international criminal law. The legacy of these two ad hoc tribunals continues to 
live and unfold through the evolving jurisprudence of international criminal law. 
 
For ICC to create a working definition the Court had the possibility to observe and avoid the 
hardships and mistakes of the ad hoc tribunals. The ICC definition is a compromise between 
the ICTR and ICTY definitions. The actus reus, instead of sexual penetration uses the term 
invasion resulting in penetration. The definition does not include gender-bias, takes into 
account possible ways of penetration and it has given a broad scope to the conditions under 
which the invasion resulting in penetration would constitute rape. Albeit, the ICC still allows 
evidence of consent if force or coercion are not proven beyond reasonable doubt. As ICC is 
different from the ad hoc tribunals in the sense that it is a permanent court and its statute is 
the product of many years of diplomatic negotiations and deliberations, the working definition 
is both, an indispensable marker but also a result of various compromises.  
 
The SCSL was able to create a definition by following the footsteps of its predecessors. The 
first definition was rather similar to Kunarac’s definition as it also emphasized on the non-
consent as an element. The second definition by the SCSL was combined by the ICC’s and 
the Kunarac’s definition. Though the first two paragraphs were almost identical to the ICC’s 
definition, the mens rea was broader and thus more effective than in Kunarac. Yet, the 
definition adopted by the Trial Chamber in Sesay was mechanical instead of conceptual. The 
lack of consent is the most unfortunate addition to this definition since as was argued 
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previously, the lack of consent should be legally irrelevant in case of rape as an international 
crime. 
 
Thus, previous definitions have struggled to establish the relationship between force, coercion 
and consent, and between the mechanical and conceptual dilemma, it is notable that current 
practice supports the notion that coercive environment negates the possibility to truly consent. 
Though, as the author supports the Akayesu definition as the most compatible and adequate to 
address the phenomenon of rape as a tactic, the broad definition can also result in 
miscategorization of certain acts. The strenght of the ICC’s definition of rape is that it is 
comprehensive and accurate, and the definition has managed to abstain from the previous 
definitional mistakes of the ad hoc tribunals. Therefore, the author is of opinion that the ICC 
has a strong and cogent definition. 
 
As expressed by Nuremberg  Tribunal more than seventy years ago the laws of war “are not 
static, but by continual adaptation follow the needs of a changing world”.255 It is clear that 
rape laws have come a long way, but as the essence of this quote explains, there is a need for 
continual adaptation and with modern definitions, the same applies. Some definitions yet are 
not following the needs of a changing world and disregard the phenomenon of rape as a tactic 
by its essence. The Akayesu and the ICC definition are yet to be the most coherent to follow 
the needs of a changing world.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
255 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945 – 1.10.1946, vol. 1, p. 221. 
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CONCLUSIONS	
 
Rape as a tactic is about punishing, destroying and dehumanizing. Rape as a tactic is a 
violation of sexual autonomy that includes abhorrent violence with a high degree of 
humiliation. It is used as a tactic by virtue of it being as a means to an end and often being 
part of a widespread and systematic policy against civilians.  
 
The jurisprudence of rape and sexual violence in international criminal law has rapidly 
evolved from the 1990s. Though, the standpoint of what exactly is sexual violence is not 
unequivocal. However, in practice the Courts have differentiated between rape and sexual 
violence by holding that the latter is broader than rape and means any act of sexual nature 
which do not include actual penetration (e.g. molestation) and does not necessarily have to 
include physical contact (e.g. forced nudity). The discussion over the definition of rape has 
been vigorous, yet there remains still no consensus as to the one appropriate definition in 
international criminal law. While the ICTR defined rape broadly as an act of sexual violence 
paralleling with torture, the ICTY, ICC and SCSL chose the narrow path creating a definition 
that mirrors national rape laws. If we just consider the definitions of these four judicial bodies 
previously presented, two main things create inconsistency and uncertainty: (1) the consent 
question – whether this is an element of rape or not;  and (2) whether the actus reus is of 
conceptual or should include a detailed list of physical acts.  
 
The element of consent is problematic on both theoretical and practical level. When we 
emphasize on nonconsent as a definitive element of rape, we emphasize on deprivation on 
sexual freedom, a denial of individual self-acting. Consent views love or passion gone wrong, 
so to speak. However, when we emphasize on coercion as definitive, we create a definition 
that sees rape fundamentally as a crime of inequality, of force, status, or relation. Coercion 
recognizes power (domination and violence). The difference was effortlessly explained by 
Catharine MacKinnon in one of her essays where she stated that consent definitions have 
proof of rape turn on victim’s and perpetrator’s mental state – who wanted what and who 
knew what when. This view makes the crime to be taken place in individual physic space. 
Coercion definitions diverge by turning the proof of rape on physical acts, surrounding 
context, or exploitation of relative position – who did what to whom (and sometimes why).  
Thus, the consent definitions tend to make the same events of crime happen in the individual 
place, one-at-a-time interactions, coercion definitions tend to express the social, contextual, 
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and collective sense of the crime.256 And while considering the essential characteristics of 
rape as a tactic, particularly the context, it is compelling to maintain that definition(s) of rape 
that prosecute international crimes and emphasize on consent, are fundamentally erroneous 
because they neglect the nature and context of these crimes. The context of war or genocidal 
campaign or widespread sexual violence already negates the individual physic space and 
instinctively create a climate of subordination for the victims. Consent as an element of rape 
should be legally irrelevant. If we consider the law and the facts of these cases, the coercive 
circumstances and the violent inequality of power positions, these rapes are taking place in a 
context where the function is to commit collective crimes. And still presuming that in conflict 
these people might have wanted the act, regardless of the force present, is purely 
unintelligible. Consenting to violence seems anyhow nonsensical, and in some jurisdictions, it 
is not even legally possible. For those reasons, consent appears to be legally incompatible 
with the international crime of rape. Thus, the evidence confirms the initial hypothesis to be 
correct - the consent paradigm, where the non-consent is an element of the definition of the 
crime of rape in international criminal law, does not adequately address rape as a tactic since 
these definitions neglect the nature and context of the crime. 
 
The second serious concern is adding the gender-bias into the definition akin the ICTY did, 
this is both shameful and unfair. Defining rape purely as male domination over women 
creates the culture of stereotypes portraying men as perpetrators and women as victims, 
translating rape of men as abnormal and immaterial. There ought to be no room for gender-
bias in rape definition(s). The presumption that perpetrators are men will firstly create the 
flourishing impunity for female perpetrators. But for even worse, presumption that victims are 
only women will create a mindset where the protection of the bodily integrity and dignity of 
men is seen as trivial. Thus, we marginalize the group of victims that is already out of sight, 
out of mind. It is time to realize that contemporary (tactical) rape is not a construction purely 
of male sexual domination. Rape is often about negotiating power between ethnicities, 
religions, cultures, and other collectives with similar construction. True, women and girls 
make the vast majority of those affected by the sexual violence, but this cannot make any 
other group of victims less material. To some extent, the international criminal law has failed 
to recognize male rape equal to female rape.  If this fight for the rights of the victim against 
the impunity is limited and selective by inadequate answers by these courts and tribunals, rape 
remains to be insufficiently addressed. All definitions come with some reservations, but the 
definition that is the most adequate answer to the rape crimes prosecuted under the 
                                                
256 MacKinnon, supra note 97, p. 941. 
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international criminal law, while taking into account the specific nature, motives and context, 
is the Akayesu definition. 
 
The need and the acknowledgement of the need to the eradication of rape have resulted in 
rape being prohibited in every major domestic legal system, included in treaty law, and 
customary law. The definitions that emerged from these landmark cases have laid the strong 
foundation for establishing accountability and fighting impunity. Yet, it is still work in 
process since no definition of rape under international law prevails, and the practice of these 
courts and tribunals have shown that not all developments equal to progress. Unsound 
definitions can still post barriers to the justice and further the cycle of impunity. While 
regarding the phenomenon of rape as a tactic often being a widespread and systematic 
campaign against the victims, it is essential to balance both, the individual needs of the 
victims against the collective human rights of the victims. The rape laws fail the victims, the 
potential future victims and the whole community when they neglect to recognize the context 
of violent inequality in which these crimes occur. They fail to neglect the nature of these 
crimes operating with false presumptions that these rapes are somehow individual sexual 
interaction matters. They fail to address the reality by creating more inequality while creating 
the consent element for rape crime. But what we can do, is to fight more efficiently, provide 
stronger protection for the victims, and maybe, through that, give at least some form of 
redress to the survivors. The legal value of rape ought to recover from centuries of ineptitude.  
 
 
As we can all agree that some malevolent deeds are unavoidable, again 
rape at no time can be construed as the necessary evil. 
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Võõrkeelne	resümee	
 
Seksuaalvägivalla sõjalise strateegiana kasutamine ei ole uus nähtus. Tegu on efektiivse 
meetodiga dehumaniseerimaks, alandamaks, karistamaks ning domineerimaks ohvrite üle. 
Seksuaalvägivald hävitab mitte ainult indiviide, vaid ka terveid kogukondasid. Tegu on 
efektiivse relvaga, sest seksuaalvägivalla kasutamine ei nõua materiaalseid resursse ning 
hõlmab endas lugematuid kombinatsioone võimalikest tagajärgedest (nt HIV/aids, 
stigmatiseerimine, depressioon, suitsiid, rasestumine, kogukonnast välja tõrjumine). Ohvrite 
hulgas on nii mehi kui naisi, lapsi ja vanureid, erivajadustega inimesi ja lapseootel naisi – kes 
iganes eesmärgi täitmiseks sobib.  
 
Käesolev magistritöö on kirjutatud teemal ”vägistamine rahvusvahelises 
kriminaalõiguses.” Töö keskendub vägistamisele sõja-, genotsiidi- ja inimsusevastaste 
kuritegude kontekstis ning on jaotatud kaheks osaks. Esimene osa käsitleb vägistamist kui 
fenomeni süsteemiebaõiguse kontekstis selgitades, millega täpselt tegu on. Eesmärk on 
vägistamine kui nähtus sisuliselt defineerida. Analüüs keskendub kolmele olulisele tahule 
nähtuse mõistmiseks: (i) vägistamise loomus (ehk kuidas ja millisel viisil neid toime 
pannakse); (ii) motiivid (ehk millisel eesmärgil vägistamist kasutatakse); ning (iii) kontekst 
(ehk kus ja millistes tingimustes vägistamine toime pannakse).  Selleks kasutas autor 
Rahvusvahelise Kriminaalkohtu (ICC), Endise Jugoslaavia Eritribunali (ICTY), Rwanda 
Eritribunali (ICTR) ja Sierra Leone Eritribunali (SCSL) kohtulahendeid.  
 
Teine osa käsitleb vägistamise kui rahvusvahelise kuriteo jurisprudentsi. Juriidiline osa 
keskendub nii rahvusvahelisele praktikale kohtutes kui ka õiguslikule definitsioonile. 
Teisisõnu, kuidas vägistamiskuritegusid rahvuvahelistes kohtutes ja tribunalides käsitletud on, 
milliste kuritegude raames menetletakse, millised elemendid selleks täidetud olema peavad 
ning kuidas vägistamine rahvusvahelises kriminaalõiguses defineeritud on. Siinkohal on 
aluseks võetud ka esimesest osast saadud tulemused vägistamise kui nähtuse sisust, mis aitas 
hinnata, millised juriidilised definitsioonid nimetatud nähtusele adekvaatselt vastavad. Erilist 
tähelepanu sai nõusoleku puudumine kui element vägistamise definitsioonist.  
 
Autor usub, et keskkond, kus need vägistamised toimuvad omavad piisavat sundi võtmaks ära 
võimaluse tõelist nõusolekut anda. Autor seadis hüpoteesiks, et ”nõusoleku lisamine 
vägistamise elemendiks rahvusvahelises kriminaalõiguses ei vasta adekvaatselt vägistamise 
kui taktika nähtusele.” Autor seadis järgnevad uurimisküsimused: (i) mis on sõjaagne 
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vägistamine; (ii) millised on vägistamiskuriteo elemendid rahvusvahelises kriminaalõiguses; 
(iii) kas need elemendid adresseerivad vägistamist kui nähtust adekvaatselt, võttes arvesse 
nimetatud nähtuse olemust, motiive ja konteksti; ning (iv) kuidas praktikas eristatakse 
vägistamist muust seksuaalvägivallast. 
 
Töö tulemusena selgus, et vägistamine kui taktika on seksuaalautonoomia rikkumine, mis 
hõlmab ebainimlikku vägivalda ning tugevalt inimväärikust alandavat kohtlemist. Kui üldiselt 
on vägistamise eesmärgid peamiselt seksuaalse sisuga, siis taktikaline vägistamine on 
eelkõige strateegia, mille eesmärk on karistadada, hävitada, hirmutada, dehumaniseerida ja 
alandada. Taktikaline vägistamine ei ole indiviidi, vaid eelkõige kogukonna või inimsuse 
vastu suunatud kuritegu. Vägistamine strateegiana on harva üksikjuhtumina esinev, enamasti 
on tegu süstemaatiliste ja laiaulatuslike episoodidega. Teise peatüki analüüsi tulemusena on 
selge, et ebainimlik vägivald, mida vägistamistega ühes kasutatakse, on väga levinud ning 
pigem kasutusel kui eraldiseisev viis, et inimesele võimalikult palju valu, kannatusi ja 
alandust põhjustada. Kui seksuaalsetel motiividel toimepandud vägistamiste puhul on 
vägivald pigem vahend, et murda ohvri tahe ning saavutada seksuaalautonoomia rikkumine, 
siis taktikalise vägistamise puhul on seksuaalsed eesmärgid pigem teisejärgulised.  
 
Ebainimlik vägivald hõlmas ohvrite vägistamist esemetega, samuti ka peale vägistamist 
erinevate esemete inimpiirkondadesse sisestamist (nt. Rwandas oli tavaliseks ohvreid 
puutükkide ja okstega vägistada, teravaid esemeid kasutades seksuaalorganeid läbistada), 
intiimpiirkondade lõikumist (esines nt Rwandas ja Sierra Leones), jäsemete maha lõikamist 
peale vägistamist (tüüpiline Sierra Leonele), grupiviisilisi vägistamisi (omane kõikidele 
analüüsitud konfliktidele) ning korduvaid vägistamisi. Ohvreid vägistati sageli seni, kuniks 
nad teadvuse kaotasid või vigastustesse surid. Bosniale omaseks oli ka vägistamislaagrite257 
nähtus, kus naised olid meestest eraldatud eesmärgiga neid korduvalt vägistada kuniks nad 
rasestuvad ja vaenlase last kannavad. Alandus oli teine eesmärk, milleks vägistamist kasutati. 
Sageli pandi vägistamised toime avalikult, perekonna või kogukonna ees. Paljudes 
kogukondades peetakse vägistamise ohvriks langemist häbiväärseks, ohvreid tõrjutakse või 
lausa heidetakse kogukonnast välja. 
 
Ning miski, mida ühiskond sageli ei soovi tunnistada - ka mehed langevad seksuaalvägivalla 
ohvriks. Meeste vastu suunatud vägistamist ja seksuaalvägivalda esines mitmetes kaasustes. 
                                                
257 Rape camp - Kinnipidamisasutused või laagrid, kus naisi hoiti spetsiaalse eesmärgiga neid 
vägistada. 
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Kui Aafrikas vägistasid sõdurid pigem ise meessoost ohvreid, tehes seda avalikult nende 
perekonna või kogukonna ees, et neid võimalikult suures ulatuses alandada, siis Bosnias 
konfliktist joondusid välja teistsugused mustrid. Seal sundisid sõdurid kinnipeetavaid 
omavahel seksuaalakte toime panema. Näiteks sunniti nii isasid ja poegasid kui ka vendasid 
omavahel oraalseksi harrastama ning seda tehti avalikult, teiste ees. Meesohvritest aga leidub 
veel vähem asitõendeid kui naisohvritest, peamiselt stigma ja häbimärgistamise tõttu, mis 
ohvriks olemisega kogukonna poolt kaasneb. Ning vägistamisi ei pane toime ainult mehed. 
Praktika näitab, et ka naised on osalevad seksuaalvägivalla toimepanemises. 2011. aastal 
mõisteti Pauline Nyiramasuhuko kui esimene naine, rahvusvahelises kohtus süüdi  
vägistamises genotsiidikuriteona.  
 
Eelnevast lähtudes on oluline, et rahvusvaheline kriminaalõigus vastaks vägistamise nähtusele 
viisil, et ükski ohver ei jääks vajaliku kaitse ning kurjategija karistuseta. Rahvusvahelises 
õiguses puudub ühene ja universaalne vägistamise definitsioon. Vägistamist ja 
seksuaalvägivalda eristab praktikas see, et vägistamine eeldab kehaõõnsusesse tungimist ehk 
penetratsiooni. Käesolevas töös analüüsiti viit rahvusvaheliste kohtute ja tribunalide poolt 
loodud definitsiooni, mille tulemusel selgus, et mitte kõik definitsioonid ei vasta vägistamise 
nähtusele adekvaatselt. Näiteks esineb definitsioone, mis on sooliselt diskrimineerivad, 
käsitledes teatud aktide puhul vaid mehi võimalike kurjategijatena ning naisi ohvritena (ICTY 
definitsioonid). See aga tekitab olukorra, kus naised pääseksid karistuseta ning samal ajal 
meeste langemist vägistamise ohvriks ei peeta samaväärseks kuriteoks kui naiste vägistamist. 
Teine läbiv probleem definitsioonides on seotud nõusoleku puudumise käsitlemisega 
vägistamiskuriteo elemendina. Lähtudes nende vägistamiste olemusest, motiividest ja 
kontekstist, millega rahvusvaheline kriminaalõigus tegeleb, ei tohiks nõusoleku puudumine 
olla kuriteokoosseisu element ega juriidiliselt määrav. Atmosfäär, kus need vägistamised 
toime pannakse sisaldab juba iseenesest sellist sundi, mis eitab isiku võimalusi tõelist 
nõusolekut anda. Seetõttu ei tohiks nõusoleku puudumise tuvastamine olla nõutav 
vägistamiskoosseisu täitmiseks. Analüüsi tulemusel leidis kinnitust hüpotees, et nõusoleku 
puudumine vägistamiskuriteo elemendina ei vasta adekvaatselt rahvusvahelises 
kriminaalõiguses käsitletava vägistamise nähtusele. Definitsioon, mis eelnimetatud nähtuse 
erisustele kõige adekvaatsemalt vastab on 1998. aastal Akayesu kaasuses (ICTR) loodud 
kontseptuaalne definitsioon. 
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